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A SOCIAL MOVEMENT HISTORY OF TITLE VII DISPARATE 
IMPACT ANALYSIS  
Susan D. Carle∗ 
Abstract 
 
This Article examines the history of Title VII disparate impact law in 
light of the policy and potential constitutional questions the Court’s recent 
decision in Ricci v. DeStefano raises. My analysis shows that, contrary to 
popular assumptions, disparate impact doctrine was not a last-minute, ill-
conceived invention of the EEOC following Title VII’s passage. Instead, it 
arose out of a moderate, experimentalist regulatory tradition that sought to 
use laws to motivate employers to reform employment practices that posed 
structural bars to employment opportunities for racial minorities, regardless 
of invidious intent. Non-lawyer activists within the National Urban League 
first pioneered these experimentalist regulatory strategies at the state level. 
They then passed them on to the EEOC for use in the early years of its 
existence, backed by the potential litigation threat posed by the NAACP. 
This Article argues that a closer look at the origins of disparate impact 
law should change the assessments of participants on all sides of the 
current debate about the future of this doctrine. Both critics of Ricci and 
disparate impact law should realize that this doctrine can do important 
legal work even if Ricci creates a new defense for employers who 
undertake good faith efforts to comply with disparate impact standards. 
Those who question the doctrine’s constitutionality should recognize its 
legitimacy as a “soft” regulatory approach that can lead to an appropriate 
balancing of pro-employer concerns about preserving business discretion 
and enhancing business rationality with the civil rights movement’s central 
concerns about identifying and dismantling intent-neutral but historically 
laden sources of unnecessary structural exclusion. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT CRISIS FACING DISPARATE 
IMPACT DOCTRINE 
In its recent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano,1 a five-to-four majority of 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the City of New Haven, Connecticut 
(City), violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 when it 
administered a written exam to the City’s firefighters to determine 
eligibility rankings for promotion but then decided not to certify the exam 
scores because they resulted in a severe “disparate impact” on the basis of 
race.3 The underlying facts were socially and politically complex: The City 
had hired professional test developers to design a pencil-and-paper exam 
for promotions to the positions of fire captain and lieutenant, and these 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 253, 253–
66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006)). 
 3. For background on disparate impact doctrine, see infra Part II.  
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experts had undertaken extensive efforts to develop written questions 
relevant to the job at issue.4 Despite these efforts to design a valid test, the 
City discovered after giving the exam that the rank ordering of candidates 
produced by its scores would have resulted in almost all white 
promotions.5 After public hearings, the City’s Civil Service Board 
deadlocked by tie vote and thus failed to certify the exam results.6 Eighteen 
of the top scoring candidates, including Frank Ricci, a white firefighter 
who suffered from dyslexia and had gone to considerable expense and 
effort to hire readers in order to study for the test, sued the City. Their 
novel case theory alleged that the City had violated Title VII by 
considering race in deciding not to make promotions based on the exam 
results.7  
Both the district court and Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ theory, 
but the Court held that the City should not have refused to certify the test 
results absent a “strong basis in evidence for the City to conclude it would 
face disparate-impact liability.”8 The Court further concluded on the 
limited summary judgment record before it that such a showing could not 
be made and took the unusual step of entering judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs on this factually disputed, incomplete record.9  
Many aspects of the Court’s decision in Ricci disappointed civil rights 
supporters. Some critics argued that the Court should have remanded the 
case for further factual findings on the test’s validity, and others noted that 
many fire departments have abandoned the use of pen-and-paper tests to 
select employees for leadership positions because the qualities most 
important to successful performance in such jobs, such as good judgment 
and the ability to remain calm under pressure, are better evaluated through 
assessment centers where candidates’ performances in simulated 
emergency situations can be observed.10 Still others expressed concern that 
Ricci may signal the end of disparate impact analysis by allowing a new 
“burden to third parties” defense through which employers can easily 
defeat disparate impact challenges.11 
Most troubling for supporters of disparate impact law were the hints in 
Ricci of possible constitutional trouble ahead for disparate impact 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2665–66. 
 5. Id. at 2666. 
 6. Id. at 2671. 
 7. Id. at 2667, 2671. 
 8. Id. at 2677. 
 9. Id. at 2681. 
 10. See, e.g., Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, Op-Ed., Trial by Firefighters, N.Y. TIMES, July 
11, 2009, at A19, available at www.nytimes.com/2009/07/11opinion11guinier.html (observing that 
pen and paper tests are not good predictors of later performance in emergency services jobs).  
 11. Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?, 
90 B.U. L. REV. 2181 (2010). Excellent discussions of the issues raised by Ricci include Cheryl I. 
Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: White(ning) Discrimination, Race-ing Test 
Fairness (UCLA Sch. of Law. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper No. 09-30, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507344. 
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analysis. Although Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
took pains to point out that “we need not reach the question whether 
respondents’ actions may have violated the Equal Protection Clause,”12 
Justice Antonin Scalia, in his concurrence, exhibited no such restraint in 
explaining the ticking time bomb issue Kennedy’s opinion narrowly 
avoided detonating. Justice Scalia observed that the Court’s “resolution of 
this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to 
confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact 
provisions of Title VII . . . consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of 
equal protection?”13  
The Court’s judgment in Ricci occurred in a climate in which a number 
of legal scholars have begun to question the continued viability of disparate 
impact doctrine. In pointing out the doctrine’s vulnerability to 
constitutional challenge, Justice Scalia cited a recent law review article by 
Professor Richard Primus.14 Other scholars have argued that Title VII’s 
core mandate prohibits intentional discrimination but not practices that 
produce disparate racial effects.15 Professor Michael Selmi, for example, 
notes that plaintiffs in Title VII disparate impact cases rarely succeed 
today, and Professor Sam Bagenstos argues that courts generally have 
difficulty handling the kinds of “structural” discrimination claims involved 
in disparate impact cases.16 These critiques have helped weaken the 
perceived legitimacy of disparate impact doctrine. 
Such critiques of disparate impact doctrine often rely, either implicitly 
or more overtly, on a commonly held assumption that the EEOC invented 
disparate impact after passage of Title VII as a kind of last-minute, ill-
conceived afterthought to support its case theory in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co.17 Even though questions concerning Congress’s intent with respect to 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664–65. 
 13. Id. at 2681–82 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 14. Id. (citing Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 493, 585–87 (2003) (questioning the constitutionality of disparate impact doctrine 
but then concluding that it is constitutionally permissible in embodying an important “structural and 
historical orientation” in this nation’s civil rights policy)).  
 15. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination 
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (arguing that “[T]here is little reason to believe that a structural 
approach to employment discrimination law will actually be successful.”); Michael Selmi, Was the 
Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 732–45 (2006) (expressing reasons to 
conclude that disparate impact theory was a “mistake”). 
 16. Bagenstos, supra note 15, at 3; Selmi, supra note 15, at 753. 
 17. 401 U.S. 424 (1970) (prohibiting, despite employer’s lack of discriminatory intent, an 
employment practice that operates to exclude a suspect class when the practice cannot be shown to 
be related to job performance). For a sample of critiques of disparate impact, see, for example, 
HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 
1960–1972, at 249–50 (1990) (“[T]he agency was prepared to defy Title VII’s restrictions and 
attempt to build a body of case law that would justify its focus on effects and its disregard of 
intent.”); see also Michael Evan Gold, Griggs’ Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and 
Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for 
Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 491–500 (1985) (arguing that Congress intended only to reach 
intentional discrimination). Other scholars have refuted Professor Hugh Davis Graham’s thesis 
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disparate impact doctrine technically became moot after Congress 
explicitly codified the Griggs disparate impact test into the language of 
Title VII in 1991,18 doubts about the historical pedigree of disparate impact 
doctrine linger in policy debates today.  
In this Article, I take a new look at the historical origins of disparate 
impact analysis. I show that the civil rights activists who first pioneered 
strategies to combat structural employment subordination were based in the 
National Urban League (NUL), and they sought to use what I will refer to 
as “experimentalist”19 regulatory techniques to induce employers to 
voluntarily scrutinize and revise traditional employment practices to open 
more employment opportunities for racial minorities. Indeed, at the earliest 
stages of the NUL campaign to address structural racial exclusion in 
employment, activists did not rely on law at all because the Court defined 
private employment as a sphere largely outside the reach of legal 
regulation. In 1945, when the State of New York passed the first 
employment antidiscrimination law to reach the private sector,20 these civil 
rights leaders and sympathetic state regulators continued to rely heavily on 
experimentalist approaches that viewed law as a means of motivating 
employers to engage in voluntary self-scrutiny and revision of their 
employment practices to increase minority employment opportunities.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the activists who pioneered these broad-based 
institutional reform efforts aimed against the structural racial exclusion in 
employment were not the movement’s radicals but held moderate, pro-
business views. The movement’s more militant activists, especially 
lawyers from the NAACP, distrusted voluntarist strategies and wanted to 
press for victories in court to prove that employers continued to engage in 
                                                                                                                     
about Congress’s intent. See, e.g., PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION TO AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION: FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW AND POLICY IN AMERICA 1933–1972, at 2 (1997) (tracing group 
rights approaches to the 1930s); Neal E. Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 
1725, 1729–30 (1991) (critiquing Graham’s thesis and showing that group rights approaches were 
well entrenched from the early days of the Kennedy administration); George Rutherglen, Disparate 
Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1344–45 
(1987) (arguing that disparate impact was within Congress’s intent in Title VII). 
 18. The language from Griggs  was added to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. 
L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006)), which rejected a Supreme Court decision that Congress viewed as unduly 
restricting disparate impact analysis. See infra Part II. 
 19. On experimentalism generally, see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998) (defining 
democratic experimentalism as a form of governance in which “power is decentralized to enable 
citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual 
circumstances”); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1067 (2004) (developing an experimentalist view of 
how public impact litigation can and should work by providing a background legal threat that 
motivates the parties to negotiate solutions to complex institutional reform problems). On applying 
experimentalist approaches to contemporary employment discrimination problems, see Susan 
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 458, 479–521 (2001). 
 20. 1945 N.Y. Laws 457–64. 
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bad discriminatory acts. This dynamic between litigation-centric militants 
and more moderate structural or institution-wide reform advocates existed 
both in the early years of New York’s Ives Quinn Act enforcement and in 
the complementary enforcement efforts of the EEOC and NAACP in the 
early years of Title VII enforcement.  
On the basis of these findings, I conclude that disparate impact doctrine 
today embodies a tension between experimentalist, incentive-shaping 
approaches to remedying employment subordination, on the one hand, and 
litigation-centric strategies aimed at proving unlawful discrimination, on 
the other. The current jurisprudential and scholarly “trouble” surrounding 
disparate impact analysis arises from a failure to appreciate this as yet 
unexplored tension within the social movement history underlying 
disparate impact doctrine. 
A new understanding of this history is particularly important at this 
juncture in light of the debate about disparate impact doctrine currently 
taking place within the courts and among commentators. Although 
historical analysis does not in itself prove the policy benefits or 
constitutionality of disparate impact doctrine, it does reveal new 
considerations of importance to these questions. If the doctrine’s origins lie 
in experimentalist alternatives to heavily litigation-centric approaches to 
discrimination law, then the views of all participants in the debate about 
the continued viability of disparate impact doctrine may require 
adjustment.  
Part II of this Article offers a short background discussion of the 
contemporary policy debates about disparate impact analysis. Part III 
sketches the social and legal conditions that early civil rights activists faced 
in formulating strategies to tackle structural employment subordination. 
Part IV examines how these social and legal conditions both constrained 
and offered avenues of possibility for civil rights activism, and how that 
activism in turn affected those conditions. Part V analyzes the implications 
of my analysis, and Part VI offers a brief conclusion, bringing the history I 
uncover back to the key issues presented in the aftermath of Ricci. 
II.  A BRIEF PRIMER ON DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 calls on employers to avoid 
using employment practices that disproportionately disadvantage persons 
on the basis of race or other protected characteristics unless the practice is 
“job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity,”22 and no alternative practice with less adverse effect exists.23 
The Court first approved disparate impact analysis—quite readily and 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 253, 253–
66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006)). 
 22. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 23. Id. § 20002-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
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without analytic trouble—in its 1971 case Griggs v. Duke Power Co.24 It 
continued to endorse this method of analysis in several subsequent cases 
under Title VII25 and, quite recently, under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act26 as well.27 In 1989, the Rehnquist Court offered a 
severely restrictive interpretation of disparate impact analysis in Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,28 but Congress quickly rejected it in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991,29 when it added statutory language to define the 
burdens of proof under that theory.30  
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 rejected the restrictive 
interpretation of disparate impact analysis offered by Wards Cove, the 
disparate impact test remains difficult for plaintiffs. This is a fact upon 
which virtually all commentators agree.31 Proving a disparate impact case 
requires both sophisticated statistical analysis to show disparate effects and 
identification of the precise practice causing these effects.32 It is today very 
rare for plaintiffs other than highly sophisticated and well-funded litigants, 
such as the U.S. Department of Justice, to prevail under Title VII on a 
disparate impact theory. For this reason and because Title VII cases rarely 
succeed in general,33 disparate impact analysis is far from a robust source 
of litigation victories today. 
Even though plaintiffs rarely win disparate impact cases today, many 
                                                                                                                     
 24. 401 U.S. 424, 424–31, 436 (1970) (disapproving an employer’s use of a high school 
diploma requirement and written tests that had a severe racial disparate impact where the employer 
had not evaluated whether these requirements were a “reasonable measure of job performance”). 
 25. See, e.g., Watson v. Forth Worth Bank Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989–91 (1988) (holding that 
disparate impact analysis can be used to challenge subjective decision-making processes that 
produce significant racially disparate impact); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 427–
34 (1975) (applying Griggs to disapprove an employer’s use of written tests with a severe racial 
disparate impact without considering whether the tests measured job performance). 
 26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). 
 27. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239–40 (2005). 
 28. 490 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1989) (holding that an employer need only offer evidence of a 
“business justification” for its challenged business practice and that plaintiffs in disparate impact 
cases have the burden of proof in rebutting the employer’s proffered business justification).  
 29. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 105–106, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75. 
 30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). 
 31. See, e.g., Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: 
What’s Griggs Still Good for? What not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597–98 (2004) (noting that 
disparate impact cases “are difficult, if not impossible, for private plaintiffs to undertake”); Selmi, 
supra note 15, at 734–43 (analyzing, with empirical analysis, the difficulty of proving disparate 
impact cases). 
 32. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 241 (holding that the plaintiffs failed to identify with sufficient 
precision the exact “practice” that caused disparate impact on the basis of age in a city’s formula for 
raising the salaries of junior public safety officers to compete with other jurisdictions). 
 33. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 432–46 (2004) (presenting data 
showing plaintiffs’ low chances of winning employment discrimination cases); Michael J. Zimmer, 
The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1887, 1943–44 (2004) (summarizing evidence that employment discrimination 
plaintiffs who allege claims other than sexual harassment fare much worse than plaintiffs in other 
types of lawsuits). 
258 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
civil rights advocates see continuing importance in retaining this theory as 
an aspect of employment antidiscrimination law. Without disparate impact 
analysis, Title VII would only prohibit employers and their agents from 
engaging in invidious acts of prejudiced decision-making. Disparate impact 
supporters view a legal requirement that employers also attend to the effects 
of their employment practices, even those adopted without discriminatory 
motive, as key to the ongoing project of opening greater employment 
opportunities to workers whose social origins are in groups not traditionally 
advantaged within the host of institutions that pass on privilege in 
American society. 
Supporters of disparate impact analysis also advance arguments based 
on the difficulty of proving hidden prejudice, the problems of subtle and 
subconscious bias,34 and the benefits of encouraging employer rationality 
and fairness in employment practices, a policy that opens opportunities for 
all, not just minorities. Professors Cheryl Harris and Kimberly West-
Faulcon demonstrate this point in analyzing the facts of Ricci: the use of an 
invalid test disserved far more whites than minorities in that very case.35 As 
Professors Lani Guinier and Susan Sturm point out, if pen and paper tests 
do not measure the key aspects of job performance required for leaders of 
firefighting crews, such as good judgment under pressure, then it would be 
best, in terms of rationality and efficacy alone, to use procedures that better 
assess this key qualification.36 Reevaluation of workplace practices with an 
eye to who is excluded and who is included can lead to many overall 
benefits, such as a better fit between employee evaluation procedures and 
job performance requirements and more rational consideration of a wider 
variety of the skill sets that are most important for particular jobs.37 On this 
argument, disparate impact analysis does not require employers to forgo 
business benefits in the interests of racial diversity, but uses racial impact 
as a warning sign that should trigger scrutiny of the rationality or fit 
between means and objectives with respect to the employment practice in 
question.38 
Popular perception sometimes conflates disparate impact analysis with 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See, e.g., Shoben, supra note 31, at 607–13 (portraying disparate impact doctrine as a 
“mighty mouse” that can rescue meritorious cases that would fail under an intentional 
discrimination test).  
 35. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 11, at 64–69 (presenting in-depth analyses of the test 
in Ricci).  
 36. Guinier & Sturm, supra note 10.  
 37. See Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REV. 253, 258 (1993) (arguing that, “[D]isparate impact . . . foster[s] 
the creation and implementation of personnel practices which will insure that business accurately 
evaluates its applicants and employees.”); cf. MARTHA MINNOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: 
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 7–9 (1990) (noting that policies of inclusion have 
many collateral policy benefits).  
 38. Cf. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11–14 (2002) (using the miner’s canary metaphor to highlight 
how attention to racial injustice can highlight policy deficiencies that threaten all citizens). 
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affirmative action,39 but the two antidiscrimination concepts are actually 
quite different. Disparate impact analysis and affirmative action are similar 
insofar as both devices require some measure of race consciousness, but 
disparate impact analysis ideally leads employers to proactively design 
their employment practices to avoid disparate impact, thus obviating the 
need for the kinds of “back end” adjustments to the results of selection 
processes that are sometimes made in the name of affirmative action.40  
The media have also tended to improperly conflate these two doctrines, 
especially in the wake of Ricci.41 This confusion may be due to the Court’s 
peculiar approach in that case, which more resembles its typical affirmative 
action analysis than the prescribed test for disparate impact. In focusing on 
the burden the City’s action placed on innocent third parties who studied 
for the exam, the Court deployed its analytic technique of “burden 
balancing,” which it typically uses in affirmative action cases, rather than 
Congress’s rules for disparate impact analysis, which require searching 
inquiry into the validity of a test once adverse impact has been shown.42  
Read narrowly, Ricci squarely stands only for the proposition that an 
employer may not first put employees or job applicants to the expense and 
effort of preparing for a high-stakes test or other employment process and 
then rescind the results on race-based grounds (at least not unless the 
evidence of the test’s illegality is strong).43 Thus, as Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg noted in her dissent, it is possible that Ricci “will not have 
staying power.”44 But it is also possible that Justice Scalia’s “evil day”45 of 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See, e.g., Juan Williams, Affirmative Action’s Untimely Obituary, WASH. POST, July 26, 
2009, at B1 (characterizing Ricci as signaling the death of affirmative action).  
 40. Cf. Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 361–62 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting angrily the cynical use of affirmative action adjustments to tests scores 
when an alternative would be to avoid using tests that produce disparate impact in the first place). 
From a historical perspective as well, the development of disparate impact analysis deserves 
attention separate from the rise of affirmative action because the rationales underlying activists’ 
efforts in the development of these two doctrines differ in important respects. Historians have 
tended to focus exclusively on, and often to criticize, the rise of affirmative action. See, e.g., 
ANTHONY S. CHEN, THE FIFTH FREEDOM: JOBS, POLITICS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1941–1972, at 232 (2009) (arguing that the conservative opposition caused the spread of state 
employment antidiscrimination statutes to be “too little too late,” resulting in the rise of unhelpful 
affirmative action policies); Eileen Boris, Fair Employment and the Origins of Affirmative Action in 
the 1940s, 10 NAT’L WOMEN’S STUD. ASS’N J. 142, 142–43 (1998) (locating the roots of 
affirmative action in the first federal executive orders banning discrimination by government 
contractors); GRAHAM, supra note 17, at 472 (“The organized beneficiaries of affirmative action 
programs have entrenched themselves . . . .”); MORENO, supra note 17, at 189–90 (tracing and 
criticizing the rise of affirmative action). 
 41. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 39 (describing Ricci as an affirmative action case). 
 42. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStephano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2676, 2681 (2009) (discussing burden 
balancing). 
 43. The majority holds that race consciousness in deciding to rescind results after test takers 
have endured an onerous testing process goes too far. Id. This holding does not address an 
employer’s duty to avoid disparate impact in designing selection procedures in the first place.  
 44. Id. at 2690 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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constitutional reckoning will soon be at hand, and if so, the general 
atmosphere of ambivalence about disparate impact, within both the Court 
and the legal academy, will undoubtedly influence those deliberations. 
Because that ambivalence arises in part from historical misimpressions, 
these bear evaluation at this critical juncture. This is the inquiry I undertake 
in Part III below.  
III.  THE CIVIL RIGHTS CAMPAIGN AGAINST RACIAL EMPLOYMENT 
SUBORDINATION 
Civil rights activism around employment discrimination can be roughly 
divided into three periods. In a first period, extending to the late 1930s, 
civil rights activists viewed the structural subordination of African 
Americans in the private-sector labor market as a key aspect of racial 
injustice, but they did not view law as a promising means for attacking this 
problem. In a second period, from approximately 1940 until the early 
1960s, activists developed legal strategies for attacking structural 
employment subordination, and especially focused on the enactment of 
state statutes that defined private-sector employment discrimination as 
unlawful. In a third period, the civil rights movement achieved a private-
sector employment antidiscrimination edict in federal law as part of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the NAACP and NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund, Inc. (LDF)46 immediately pursued disparate impact test cases, 
building on case theories already developed at the state level and leading to 
Griggs as one piece of such test case litigation.  
In the narrative I present below, I discuss some of the highlights of this 
three-stage history, focusing especially on the thought and activism of early 
civil rights leaders that remain less well known today while pointing to the 
already well established literature documenting later stages.  
A.  Early Social Movement Activism on Employment Subordination, 
1830–1910 
 Employment issues were on the radar screen of civil rights activists as 
early as the African American Convention Movement starting in the 
1830s.47 Indeed, the first national convention meeting was precipitated by 
an 1829 Cincinnati, Ohio, labor conflict between skilled African American 
craftsmen and white laborers.48 In 1848, a Cleveland convention meeting 
                                                                                                                     
 46. LDF was created as a separate entity than the NAACP in 1940 and became a completely 
autonomous organization in 1957. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A 
DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 19, 223 (1994). The two 
organizations coordinated their disparate impact campaigns. See id. at 413–14. 
 47. See generally HOWARD HOLMAN BELL, A SURVEY OF THE NEGRO CONVENTION MOVEMENT 
1830–1861, at 13–15 (describing convention movement activities in more detail) (Arno Press, Inc. 
1969) (1953); AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1880–1915, at 4–16 (Ann Arbor 
Paperback ed., Univ. of Mich. Press 1988) (1966) (discussing the convention movement).  
 48. See BELL, supra note 47, at 12 (explaining that the 1830 meeting was called based on the 
perceived need to respond to an “emergency [growing] out of the increasing friction between Negro 
and white laborers in Cincinnati”). 
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developed a manifesto signed by Frederick Douglass and other leading 
African American abolitionists who expressed a determination, according 
to one newspaper account, “to abandon shaving beard[s], blacking boots, 
and carrying trunks or parcels—their ambition is roused to higher 
occupations.”49 To Douglass, “shaving, boot-blacking, and carrying 
parcels, are nothing better than being slaves to the community; and [we] 
ought never to relax [our] agitation until this species of slavery is abolished 
as firmly as that which exists in the South.”50  
From 1869 to 1871, according to historian August Meier, convention 
meetings were “devoted largely to the problems of Negro workers.”51 At 
the 1869 Colored National Labor Convention, participants protested “the 
exclusion from apprenticeships and workshops practiced by trade unions,” 
and organized a new national union that would “make no discrimination as 
to nationality or color.”52 Convention attendees pointed out that it was 
“suicidal for members of the laboring class to be arrayed against each 
other,” and emphasized the close links among the issues of labor, 
education and political rights, proclaiming as their motto “liberty and 
labor, enfranchisement, [sic] and education!”53  
This linking of labor and employment issues with political and civil 
rights concerns continued in the later 19th Century with the founding of the 
Afro-American League (AAL) in 1887,54and then W.E.B. Du Bois’s 
Niagara Movement in 1905.55 These organizations were short lived, and I 
have elsewhere explored in detail the transmission and transformation of 
ideas linking issues of economic and employment justice to civil and 
political rights through them, so I will not trace that process here.56 Suffice 
it to say that recognition of the importance of tackling structural 
employment subordination was passed on, primarily through Du Bois, 
from those predominantly African-American, precursor organizations to 
the NAACP, founded by a racially mixed group of progressive activists in 
1909.57 Participants at the NAACP’s founding convention engaged in a 
great deal of talk about the systemic barriers blocking African-American 
employment opportunity and economic advancement, but decided that the 
organization should focus its energies on a “political and civil rights 
bureau,” which “would bend its energies” to “obtaining court decisions 
upon the disenfranchising laws and other discriminatory legislation.”58  
                                                                                                                     
 49. Great Abolition Movement—Manifesto of the Negros, BENNETT’S N.Y. HERALD, reprinted 
in THE NORTH STAR, Nov. 19, 1848.  
 50. Id. 
 51. MEIER, supra note 47, at 8. 
 52. Id. at 9. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Susan D. Carle, Debunking the Myth of Civil Rights Liberalism: Visions of Racial Justice 
in the Thought of T. Thomas Fortune, 1880–1890, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1479, 1482 (2009). 
 55. Id. at 1526. 
 56. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 54, at 1517–24. 
 57. Id. at 1530 & n.265. 
 58. Oswald Garrison Villard, The Need of Organization, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL 
NEGRO CONFERENCE 1909, at 197, 203 (William Loren Katz ed., 1969).  
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To handle non-legal economic and social matters, the NAACP’s first 
board decided to partner with the National Urban League (NUL), a sister 
organization that had come into being in New York City in 1910, and to 
divide the work based on each organization’s special strengths.59 The 
NAACP and NUL divided their respective terrains according to the 
conceptual divide under the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence between 
political and civil rights matters reachable by law, on the one hand, and 
social and economic matters largely outside the scope of law’s reach, on 
the other.60 Political and civil rights issues, amenable to test case litigation 
in the courts, would fall under the purview of the NAACP, which was 
already developing a national legal committee of leading lawyers.61 
Matters of social and economic justice, falling in the private sphere and 
thus reachable primarily through tactics of persuasion and voluntary action, 
would be assigned to the NUL.62  
An evaluation of the early 20th Century civil rights campaign to combat 
employment subordination on the basis of race must start with an 
understanding of the social and legal conditions activists faced as they 
sought to develop effective strategies. These conditions included, most 
importantly, a massive and virtually airtight structural bar on opportunities 
for disfavored minorities’ employment advancement, imposed by a 
complex set of institutions including law, tradition, white violence, and 
racially exclusionary trade union policies. At the same time, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence carved a legal landscape that blocked some 
avenues for reform but left open others. Activists responded to these social 
and legal conditions by fashioning strategies that fit their historical context.  
1.  Social Conditions  
Subordination in the sphere of employment has long been a central 
aspect of racial injustice in the United States. Prior to emancipation, that 
subordination included not only the institution of slavery in the South, of 
course, but also the limiting of employment opportunities for free persons 
of color in the North.63  
                                                                                                                     
 59. See NANCY J. WEISS, THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, 1910–1940, at 65–66 (1974). 
 60. Id. at 65–66.  
In February 1911, representatives of the NAACP and the Committee on Urban 
Conditions met and agreed that the two organizations should cooperate without 
overlapping in their work. The NAACP would “occupy itself principally with the 
political, civil and social rights of the colored people,” while the Committee on 
Urban Conditions would deal “primarily with questions of philanthropy and social 
economy.” 
 Id. at 65 (external citation omitted). 
 61. See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–1920), 20 
LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 106–15 (2002) (describing the NAACP’s first national legal committee).  
 62. WEISS, supra note 59, at 66 (“[T]he NAACP worked chiefly through political and legal 
channels and advocated public protest and agitation . . . . [while the] Urban League concerned itself 
primarily with seeking employment opportunities for blacks and providing social services . . . .”).  
 63. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO FREE STATES, 1790–1860, at vii–
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Although one might forecast that employment opportunities for African 
Americans would improve after emancipation, precisely the opposite trend 
occurred. Between the end of Reconstruction and the mid-20th Century, a 
time aptly termed the “nadir” of American race relations,64 African 
Americans of all levels of educational and occupational attainment found 
themselves squeezed out of more desirable occupations and forced into the 
least remunerative and lowest-status employment sectors.65  
The forces that produced such dramatic downward mobility on the basis 
of race across the broad range of occupational classifications were of 
several types. Prejudice in the hearts of individual employers and potential 
business clients was certainly a major factor, but it was not the only one. 
Indeed, even in the South, employers focused on lowering production costs 
recognized that African Americans could be hired for significantly lower 
wages than whites due to discrimination in a race-stratified labor market 
and viewed this labor pool as a desirable source of inexpensive labor.66 
The block that prevented these employers from employing African 
Americans was not their own prejudice but resistance from white workers, 
who exercised means ranging from legislation to violence to force African 
Americans out of desirable work.67  
Such resistance took place in both the North and South. In the South, 
                                                                                                                     
ix, 153, 155, 157, 178–80 (1961) (describing employment discrimination that existed in the 
antebellum North). 
 64. See RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT: THE NADIR 1877–
1901, at ix–x (1954) (naming and defining the historical period of “the nadir”); see also RAYFORD 
W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES TO WOODROW WILSON 11 
(New, Enlarged ed., Collier Books 1965) (1954) (noting in a new edition to his classic book the 
debate about dating the nadir and suggesting that it extended into the 1920s).  
 65. See, e.g., JOHN DITTMER, BLACK GEORGIA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: 1900–1920, at 32–34 
(1977) (describing late 19th Century employment conditions for African Americans in railroads and 
textiles in Atlanta, Georgia); ALMA HERBST, THE NEGRO IN THE SLAUGHTERING AND MEAT-PACKING 
INDUSTRY IN CHICAGO 17 (1932) (describing change in white workers’ attitudes towards African 
American meatpacking workers in the 1890s); JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN 
DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM 35 (Simon & Schuster 2006) (2005) (noting that, 
“Occupationally, blacks fared even worse” with the rise of Jim Crow. “Before the Nadir, African 
Americans worked as carpenters, masons, foundry and factory workers, postal carriers, and so on. 
After 1890, in both the North and the South, whites expelled them from these occupations.”); 
ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO, 1890–1920, at 29–35 (1967) 
(describing decline in job prospects for working class African Americans in Chicago at turn of the 
20th Century). Chicanos had similar experiences. See Juan Gómez-Quiñones, The First Steps: 
Chicano Labor Conflict and Organizing, 1900–1920, 3 AZATLAN CHICANO J. SOC. SCI. & ART 13, 
22–24 (1972). 
 66. See, e.g., PAUL ORTIZ, EMANCIPATION BETRAYED: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF BLACK 
ORGANIZING AND WHITE VIOLENCE IN FLORIDA FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE BLOODY ELECTION OF 
1920, at 11 (2005) (quoting one white southern politician’s observation that, “Colored labor is the 
cheapest, and therefore just the kind suited to the South in its present condition. This fact must have 
weight also with capitalists, for other things being equal, the returns from an investment must 
increase in proportion to the cheapness of the labor employed.”).  
 67. See, e.g., MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 106 (2004) (“Unions secured legislation that required 
that plumbers and electricians be licensed—measures that proved effective at excluding blacks. On 
the railroads, black firemen lost jobs through a terrorist campaign that killed dozens.”). 
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labor-related white violence included spontaneous mob lynchings68 and 
more sustained campaigns by white-led trade unions in industrial sectors, 
such as railroads, construction, and textiles, to bar African Americans from 
all but the least desirable and most difficult jobs.69 The 1909 railroad strike 
in Georgia, in which railway unions struck to insist on the removal of 
African American workers from more desirable operating positions, 
provides one of many such examples. The racial violence that ensued 
included the murder of African American workers, but the governor of the 
state refused to intervene, instead expressing support for the aims of the 
strikers.70  
In the South, as Professor Michael Klarman has shown, Jim Crow was 
both an informal, private practice and was instantiated in public laws. The 
informal, private-actor aspects of Jim Crow, including the constriction of 
private employment opportunities for African Americans, went hand-in-
hand with the public and legal aspects of that institution. Just as Jim Crow 
pervaded essential public and social goods such as education, housing, 
transportation, and public accommodations, it also had deeply entrenched 
aspects in the sphere of private employment.71  
In the North, white violence aimed at excluding workers of color from 
desirable jobs often involved attacks against African American 
strikebreakers, whom employers sometimes imported by the trainload from 
the South, offering wages that were low by Northern standards but 
attractive in comparison to the race-segregated and economically depressed 
Southern labor market.72 Such strike-related racial violence followed 
                                                                                                                     
 68. See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF 
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 172–76, 339–40, 366–67 (2008) 
(documenting the extent and brutality of the peonage labor system imposed on African Americans 
in the timber, turpentine, and phosphate industries); W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE 
NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880–1930, at 113 (First Paperback ed. 1993) (1959) (noting 
that a deep cause of lynchings was “planters’ reliance upon the threat of violence to . . . secure a 
hold over subdued and inarticulate black laborers”); GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: 
THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 22–25, 35, 38, 49, 69 (1984) 
(describing labor competition between whites and African Americans as a cause of mob violence); 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RACE RIOTS, VOL.1: A–M 361 (Walter Rucker & James Nathaniel 
Upton eds., 2007) [hereinafter RACE RIOTS I] (describing various labor-related incidents of racial 
violence in the post-Reconstruction Era); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RACE RIOTS, VOL. 2: N-Z 
AND PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 460 (Walter Rucker & James Nathaniel Upton eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
RACE RIOTS II] (describing various labor-related incidents of racial violence in the post-
Reconstruction Era). 
 69. See DITTMER, supra note 65, at 32–34 (describing exclusion in Georgia of African 
Americans by most white trade unions and strikes by these unions to protest the hiring of African 
American workers).  
 70. Id. (“[Blacks were] stoned and beaten by mobs” during the strike and when “[t]he 
company asked [the] Governor . . . to protect the trains . . . the governor sympathized with the 
strikers and refused to act.”).  
 71. KLARMAN, supra note 67, at 61–97 (discussing the complex interrelationship between 
informal practice and law regarding race in the Progressive era). 
 72. See HERBST, supra note 65, at 17–18, 18 n.1 (describing violence against African-
American strikebreakers in the Pullman Strike of 1894); KLARMAN, supra note 67, at 64 (“Massive 
outbreaks of white-on-black violence erupted in East St. Louis in 1917 . . . killing an estimated 
2011] SOCIAL MOVEMENT HISTORY 265 
 
longstanding patterns of ethnic conflict between older and newer 
immigrant groups that characterized labor competition in many 
employment sectors.73 But the salience of race as a social identity 
characteristic meant that race-based labor competition did not dissipate 
over time as it had for immigrant groups that eventually became ethnically 
“white.” Instead, in cosmopolitan northern cities such as Chicago and New 
York, a race-based structural ceiling on employment mobility became ever 
more oppressive between the end of Reconstruction and the mid-20th 
Century as it became locked in deepening layers of history and tradition.  
By the early 20th Century, Jim Crow attitudes pervaded the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), which abandoned even the pretense of racially 
non-discriminatory policies.74 Although some visionary labor leaders 
continued to advocate racially inclusionary organizing models,75 policies of 
racial exclusion dominated the trade union movement until the rise in the 
1930s of the far less racially prejudiced (though still less than perfect) 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).76 
African American workers’ downward mobility in the post-
Reconstruction period affected not only members of the working class but 
also professionals, who saw their white client bases shriveled as the nation 
divided into separate worlds. Educated African American male 
professionals had long worked as lawyers, doctors, successful business 
owners, and public servants,77 but the coming of Jim Crow negatively 
affected these employment sectors as well,78 further contributing to the 
                                                                                                                     
forty-eight . . . people . . . most of them black.”); WILLIAM M. TUTTLE, JR., RACE RIOT: CHICAGO IN 
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RACE RIOTS II, supra note 68, at 552–53 (describing 1919 national steel industry strike that led to 
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 73. See, e.g., John R. Commons, Labor Conditions in Meat Packing and the Recent Strike, 19 
Q.J. ECON. 1, 6–7, 28–30 (1904) (describing patterns of ethnic competition and conflict in the meat 
packing industry as successive waves of new immigrant groups vied for more desirable, higher 
skilled occupations dominated by members of immigrant groups who had arrived earlier). 
 74. See Bernard Mandel, Samuel Gompers and the Negro Workers, 1886–1914, 40 J. NEGRO 
HIST. 34, 53–60 (1955) (tracing the rise of Jim Crow thinking by former AFL President Samuel 
Gompers and the AFL).  
 75. William M. Tuttle, Jr., Labor Conflicts and Racial Violence: The Black Worker in 
Chicago, 1894–1919, 10 J. LABOR HIST. 408, 411–13 (1969) (describing progressive racial views of 
the president and secretary treasurer of a Chicago meat cutters union).  
 76. On the improved but mixed race record of the CIO, see Rick Halpern, Organized Labor, 
Black Workers, and the Twentieth Century South: The Emerging Revision, in RACE AND CLASS IN 
THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE 1890, at 43, 61–75 (Melvyn Stokes & Rick Halpern eds., 1994) 
(describing the complex history of CIO’s record on race). 
 77. See generally WILLARD B. GATEWOOD, ARISTOCRATS OF COLOR: THE BLACK ELITE, 1880–
1920 (1990) (describing the occupations of this African American “upper class”).  
 78. See MARK SCHNEIDER, BOSTON CONFRONTS JIM CROW, 1890–1920, at 7 (2009) 
(describing how the tightening of professional opportunities motivated members of the African 
American elite to greater activism); MEIER, supra note 47, at 154 (discussing African American 
professionals’ reaction to the rise of Jim Crow in Chicago); see also ALBERT S. BROUSSARD, 
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pervasive exclusion of persons of color from traditional routes for 
professional—and thus economic–advancement. 
In short, although particularized acts of prejudiced employer decision-
making certainly constituted one salient factor blocking African American 
employment mobility through the course of the late 19th and early 20th 
Centuries, third party agency also played a major role. White majorities 
used democratic processes to prevail on legislatures to enact sometimes 
facially and sometimes indirectly discriminatory laws to bar African 
Americans from jobs desired by native-born and European-immigrant 
whites, and tradition, mob violence, and organized campaigns by white 
trade unions, including exclusionary membership bars and striker violence, 
further contributed to the imposition of pervasive structural bars against 
employment opportunities on the basis of race.79  
Statistics reflect the structural character of the employment 
discrimination early civil rights activists confronted as they developed 
reform strategies.80 New York City, the country’s largest metropolitan area 
at the turn of the 20th Century, is an illustrative example. There, NUL 
leader George Edmund Haynes prepared a 1905 report of African 
American employment patterns that played an important role in guiding the 
NUL’s early strategy.81 Haynes found that the overwhelming majority of 
African American wage earners worked in domestic and personal service 
while much more limited numbers were bookkeepers, accountants, and 
workers engaged in transportation, manufacturing, and mechanical 
occupations.  
Among African American male wage earners, the most common 
occupations were in domestic and personal service (40.2%), followed by 
trade (20.6%), transportation (9.4%), manufacturing and mechanical 
pursuits (7.9%), and public service jobs (1.4%). Among African American 
women wage earners, domestic and personal services accounted for the 
vast bulk of paid employment (89.3%), followed by manufacturing and 
mechanical pursuits, mostly in the garment industry (5.5%), and trade 
(0.6%).82 Few African American workers engaged in skilled trades or were 
                                                                                                                     
AFRICAN-AMERICAN ODYSSEY: THE STEWARTS, 1853–1963 (1998) (chronicling the declining 
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members of associated trade unions.83 Fewer than 500 African Americans 
in the city served as proprietors of establishments, ranging from boarding 
houses, hotels, restaurants, and saloons to merchandising.84 Business 
directories showed others owning barber, grocery, and tailoring enterprises, 
with the typical business being a small retail establishment with two or 
fewer employees and little floor space.85 But these businesses were 
experiencing increasingly severe competition from white firms with larger 
capital bases and more extensive credit, as well as declining support among 
white customers.86  
Not only these structural social conditions but also the contours of law 
affected civil rights activists’ strategies, and it thus bears exploring why 
early 20th Century activism on employment discrimination took the 
direction that it did. 
2.  Legal Conditions 
 A key feature of the law that shaped early 20th Century race activism 
was the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. Until the mid-
20th Century, the relevant test for the reach of civil rights law focused not 
on the intent versus effects standards so pertinent today, but on the 
distinction between public and private action. Private action in the 
economic realm was to late 19th and early 20th Century jurists generally 
not reachable through law, and thus, legislation aimed at protecting 
workers against discrimination—at least as applicable to able-bodied 
citizens, as opposed to legally infirm and weaker beings such as women—
was rarely constitutionally permissible. The Court carved this 
jurisprudence in two lines of cases.  
a.  The Civil Rights Cases 
 In 1883, the Court decided The Civil Rights Cases, declaring invalid the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875,87 which provided that all citizens of the United 
States “‘shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public 
conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public 
amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations . . . applicable 
alike to citizens of every race and color.’”88 The Court decided that this 
statute impermissibly sought to regulate action beyond that of the state 
itself by laying “down rules for the conduct of individuals in society 
towards each other.”89 In his dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan disputed 
where the Court had chosen to draw the line between public and private 
action, arguing that Congress’s power to legislate to remove the badges of 
                                                                                                                     
 83. Id. at 82–83. 
 84. Id. at 97. 
 85. Id. at 107–08.  
 86. Id. at 123–24. 
 87. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
 88. Id. at 9 (quoting Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335).  
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inferiority associated with slavery should extend to “at least, such 
individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and wield power 
and authority under the state.”90 Noting that corporations such as railroads 
are granted special powers under law to carry out public purposes and are 
subject to state control for public benefit, Harlan reasoned that the right of 
a person of color to use the public services provided by such corporations 
was a fundamental freedom just as other state-provided civil and political 
rights were.91 
The Civil Rights Cases met with passionate criticism among civil rights 
leaders,92 but the Court’s holding appeared clear: federal civil rights 
legislation could not seek to control the conduct of private actors. Activists 
detected room for expansion of the state action doctrine to cover quasi-
public functions, as Harlan had argued, and focused on passing state public 
accommodations nondiscrimination statutes in a few northern states.93 
They also found their hands more than full seeking to fight various anti-
civil rights legislative initiatives in the South. But one avenue of legislative 
activism they did not pursue was an effort to extend the reach of law into 
private-sector employment. This legal avenue was not completely barred 
by The Civil Rights Cases, which had addressed the power of the national 
government to legislate against racial discrimination; the question of each 
individual state’s power to enact state legislation against discrimination 
was a separate one.94 The states could regulate local matters, and some 
states did adopt legislation banning segregation in intrastate public 
transportation and accommodations, as already noted.95 But even though 
activists did secure a handful of proactive state legislative initiatives on 
civil rights issues in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, none ventured 
into the area of private-sector employment discrimination, giving rise to 
the question of why they did not attempt this legislative strategy. 
b.  Lochner v. New York 
One part of the explanation lies in the Lochner Court’s jurisprudence on 
labor regulation. That jurisprudence insulated employers from much 
government regulation (federal or state) on “freedom of contract” and/or 
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commerce clause grounds. The Court in Lochner v. New York96 struck 
down a state law setting maximum hours for male bakery workers and 
reached similar results in many more employment regulation cases,97 
continuing until President Franklin Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan finally 
precipitated the end of its era of formalist jurisprudence and opened the 
way to greater regulation of the employment relationship during the New 
Deal.98  
But this legal landscape only partly explains why civil rights activists 
did not seek to regulate private employment discrimination. The fact that 
they could have pursued a legislative strategy is clearly demonstrated by 
the counterexample of late 19th and early 20th Century white women 
reformers’ pursuit of legislative strategies for worker protection laws well 
before the New Deal.99 To be sure, these initiatives risked being struck 
down by the Supreme Court,100 but these reform groups nevertheless 
continued to press for such laws. Civil rights activists clearly knew about 
this work because the two activist networks overlapped.101 Thus, other 
factors must explain why civil rights leaders did not pursue legislative 
strategies to address racial harms in private employment until the New 
Deal.  
One factor must have involved civil rights activists’ realistic assessment 
of their relatively weak political power and need to conserve scarce 
resources for the most potentially winnable legislative campaigns, as well 
as their accurate perceptions that they would have met with insurmountable 
opposition from the politically powerful AFL. But another factor arguably 
                                                                                                                     
 96. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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at play involves activists’ focus on the idea of becoming equal civil and 
political citizens.102 To many late 19th and early 20th Century civil rights 
activists, freedom of contract did not appear as an impediment to their 
plans but was, to the contrary, a positive good.103 Considered from the 
vantage point of slavery’s legacy, freedom of labor was the point. The 
doctrine of formally equivalent rights on the part of employers and 
employees had helped liberate African American workers from coerced 
labor, as in peonage cases such as Bailey v. Alabama.104 Under Lochner-
era jurisprudence, to ask the state for employment protection would have 
seemed tantamount to an acknowledgment of inferior citizenship status or 
disability on the part of the workers so protected. Just such arguments of 
inferiority had been used to support protective labor regulation for women 
in cases such as Muller v. Oregon.105 Civil rights activists understandably 
avoided strategies that would have involved asking the state for protections 
special to persons of color at this early stage in the development of 
strategies to combat employment subordination. 
In short, law and legal ideologies shaped the social and political 
landscape within which civil rights movement activists planned their 
strategies and also arguably shaped their normative consciousness about 
what they wanted law to do. A campaign aimed at achieving passage of 
employment antidiscrimination law covering the private sector was beyond 
the scope of both what was possible and what was desirable in the eyes of 
civil rights activists prior to the New Deal.  
Activists did begin to succeed in initiatives to require state and 
municipal (i.e., public) employers to avoid discrimination in their 
employment practices, and by World War I, they had begun to make 
arguments about the nondiscrimination duties of government contractors as 
well. But it would not be until World War II that serious efforts would get 
under way to extend the antidiscrimination mandate to private employment 
generally.  
B.  The Early Employment Opportunity Work of the National Urban 
League, 1910–1930 
The NUL was well suited to handle the non-law, social and economic 
conditions work of the early 20th Century civil rights movement because 
social work had been the specialty of the two prior organizations that 
merged to create the NUL. These two organizations were the National 
League for the Protection of Colored Women, whose work had 
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concentrated on providing assistance to African American women 
migrating to New York City, following a model pioneered by African 
American journalist and club woman Victoria Earle Matthews through her 
White Rose Mission, founded in 1897, and the Committee for Improving 
the Industrial Conditions of the Negro, which had been founded in 1906 by 
William Lewis Bulkley and others to help African-American workers 
acquire the skills, training, and willing employers to secure economically 
sustainable work, and “to educate whites about black capabilities and enlist 
their help in improving industrial conditions.”106  
After the merger, Bulkley became one of the NUL’s most dedicated 
leaders while also continuing to work on a host of other civil rights and 
social betterment activities.107 With distinguished academic credentials, 
Bulkley held the honor of being the first African American principal to be 
appointed within New York City’s newly consolidated school system.108 
He initiated an evening program at his school to offer industrial and 
commercial training to youth,109 hoping in this way to help his 
predominantly African American students learn trades through which they 
could improve their employment prospects.  
In a 1906 article, Bulkley articulated his views about the causes of 
racial employment discrimination.110 He argued that the cause was the 
nature of the structural caste system,111 and pointed to three main aspects, 
namely: (1) bars to hiring by white-led unions,112 (2) employer prejudice,113 
and (3) a systemic lack of training opportunities. In his 1909 speech at the 
NAACP’s founding convention, Bulkley similarly pointed to the “unjust 
industrial restrictions” placed “upon us as a people,”114 and addressed its 
many manifestations, such as the 1909 Georgia Railroad Strike then 
underway, in which white railroad unions had demanded the exclusion of 
African Americans from desirable operating positions. Bulkley attacked 
                                                                                                                     
 106. WEISS, supra note 59, at 27. 
 107. On Bulkley’s work with organizations other than the NUL, see GUICHARD PARRIS & 
LESTER BROOKS, BLACKS IN THE CITY: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE 11–12, 187 
(1971). 
 108. WEISS, supra note 59, at 21. For a brief summary of Bulkley’s educational history and 
professional background prior to this appointment, see Colored School Principal: William L. 
Bulkley To Be Nominated to Public School No. 80, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1901, at 2. 
 109. Id. at 22. 
 110. William L. Bulkley, The Industrial Condition of the Negro in New York City, 27 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 128, 129–31 (1906).  
 111. Id. at 131.  
 112. Id. at 129.  
 113. Bulkley saw this factor as especially salient in the lack of opportunities in business. 
Bulkley described experiences he had in striving to place good students as office workers, only to 
receive the “expected reply that no [African American], however promising, was wanted.” Id. at 
130. Ardent as Bulkley was, the lenses of his historical period did not yet provide him with the 
perspective that such employer conduct was unlawful. Instead, Bulkley reported that in response to 
such experiences, he “heaved a sigh and went on.” Id. 
 114. See William L. Bulkley, Race Prejudice As Viewed from an Economic Standpoint, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL NEGRO CONFERENCE 1909, supra note 58, at 89, 89. 
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the structures under which there are “classes of skilled labor which it is not 
permitted a Negro to enter,” and further noted that “even certain vocations 
which belonged almost exclusively to the Negroes ever since the days of 
slavery are fast being closed against them,” thus “keeping within the 
bounds of unskilled labor those who might do credit in the ranks of skilled 
labor.”115 In the North, Bulkley argued it was not “prejudice that keeps 
Negroes out of the industrial fields” as much as “the native white man and 
the foreigner[’s]” jealous guarding of approaches to skilled labor.116 
Expressing optimism about the future, Bulkley described a strategy focused 
both on improved education and on the creation of increased economic and 
employment opportunities through activist appeals to employers for 
voluntary action.117  
Bulkley was a civil rights radical, but other leaders and funders of the 
early NUL were far more moderate.118 This mix of leaders meant that the 
NUL’s character quickly took on a more conservative and staid quality 
than that of the NAACP.119 The NUL is often criticized on this ground, 
dismissed for being the NAACP’s more conservative cousin, but the 
contrast in the reputations of NUL and NAACP was a shrewd strategy, 
allowing the NAACP to engage in more strident political and legal 
demands without impeding the ability of NUL to put on a more 
conciliatory face in working with white employers. This difference 
permitted the NUL to pursue its central objective of achieving greater 
industrial opportunities for African American workers through voluntary 
persuasion directed toward the employer community. The NUL focused on 
voluntarist strategies, but at the same time, held a structural perspective on 
the problem of racial employment subordination.120 Its leaders, many of 
whom were trained in sociology, applied a sociological perspective Reed 
has emphasized.121 
Consistent with this philosophy, the NUL’s early work in New York 
City focused on campaigns to persuade employers to hire African 
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 116. Id. at 93–94.  
 117. See id. at 96.  
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American candidates.122 At the same time, the NUL offered training 
programs and employment counseling and placement services so that job 
applicants would have the qualifications to interest employers. The NUL 
hoped to duplicate similar models in other major urban centers.123 
NUL historian Nancy Weiss has pointed out that although the NUL 
took many of its goals and strategies from the settlement house movement, 
it did not in its early years work for legislative reform as settlement house 
workers did.124 Weiss properly sees this as a somewhat curious fact, but 
does not explore how the law shaped NUL leaders’ strategic decisions. As 
I have suggested in Part III.A.2, the constraints imposed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence help explain why civil rights leaders did 
not pursue employment antidiscrimination legislation in this early period. 
 Another part of the NUL’s early work involved efforts to reach out to 
the white-led labor movement,125 then consolidating under a private trade 
union model after the demise of the Knights of Labor, which had been far 
more inclusive of African Americans.126 The AFL’s rise to dominance took 
place under the leadership of Samuel Gompers, whose attitude became 
increasingly racially prejudiced as the Jim Crow Era progressed.127 The 
NUL and the NAACP were unsuccessful in their persuasive efforts at the 
time; a new day for labor on race issues would have to await the coming of 
the more racially inclusive Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 
the 1930s.128 
The commencement of the great migration of African Americans to the 
industrial centers of the North with the onset of World War I129 brought 
new challenges and opportunities to the NUL. Migration brought 
newcomers to the cities, which in turn, led to increasing race conflict and 
discrimination.130 NUL leaders saw growing urgency to their goal of 
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expanding employment opportunities.131 The war also highlighted the close 
relationship between the government and the private sector. This 
connection would become even clearer during World War II, but even 
during World War I activists saw opportunity in the government’s 
spending on wartime defense to boost African American employment in 
defense-sector industries.132  
C.  Consumer Boycotts and the Road to Private Employment 
Antidiscrimination Law, 1930–1945 
By the early 1930s, in the face of the Great Depression, the mood of 
African Americans, and the country as a whole, had become less patient 
and more pessimistic. The NUL, along with local and regional civil rights 
groups, found itself being asked to employ more confrontational 
approaches to persuade recalcitrant employers to change their hiring 
practices.133 Learning from the tactics of the labor movement, NUL leaders 
began to see the benefits of using pressure tactics against employers to 
demand the hiring of persons of color.134 Even some formerly staid NUL 
activists began to take to the streets—albeit in a dignified manner—to 
picket employers who refused to hire African Americans.135 Some 
historians date the rise of a “group oriented” approach to assessing the 
presence of employment discrimination to the rise of this “Don’t Buy 
Where You Can’t Work” campaign.136  
African American intellectuals debated the benefits and drawbacks of 
this tactic. Ralph Bunche, for example, argued that group-interest tactics 
served only to pit white and African American workers against each other 
and proved ineffective once pickets left anyway.137 These debates would 
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continue long into the future, but by 1940, new legal avenues for change 
opened up, which enticed activists to attempt a legal-regulatory approach.  
D.  Passage and Enforcement of the Nation’s First State Statute 
Banning Private-Sector Employment Discrimination, 1945–1960 
A confluence of factors brought about the conditions for passage of a 
state law banning private-sector employment discrimination. The Great 
Migration, with its associated movement of African American workers into 
industrial employment during both World Wars, followed by their ejection 
at each war’s end,138 increased African Americans’ voting power in the 
North and their vocal frustration about discrimination in employment. 
Proud contingents of African American soldiers returning from brave 
service in both wars conveyed important symbolism to both African 
Americans and whites.139 At the same time, the rise of nationalist rhetoric 
and racial and religious hostilities in Europe shocked white Americans into 
a greater recognition of the perniciousness of race prejudice in their own 
society.140 A number of developments signaled gradual cultural change, 
including the rise of the less racially prejudiced CIO141 and some white 
religious groups’ growing concern about racial injustice.142  
The legal terrain was also shifting. A. Phillip Randolph, president of the 
first nationally powerful African American labor union, the Brotherhood of 
Sleeping Car Porters, threatened President Franklin Roosevelt with a 
massive march on Washington to protest race discrimination in 
employment by federal government contractors during World War II, 
leading to negotiations that resulted in the President’s adoption of 
Executive Order 8802, which banned discrimination by government 
contractors during the war effort.143 In the late 1930s, Roosevelt’s Court-
packing plan indirectly brought about the end of the Lochner Era, and 
Congress was able to pass, without the Court invalidating, a host of new 
labor laws, including the National Labor Relations Act and  minimum 
wage and maximum hours laws for some employment sectors outside 
domestic service and agriculture. Civil rights leaders saw both of these 
pieces of legislation as contrary to the interests of many workers of color, 
and as likely motivated by racial bias as well,144 but these statutes at least 
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showed the feasibility of new employment legislation approaches. 
Thus, even at the close of World War II, civil rights activists faced an 
important strategic decision about whether to pursue protective 
employment legislation as a solution to the problem of employment 
subordination. Varied ideas developed through prior decades remained in 
play, including a voluntarist, racial uplift and liberty of contract strain; 
radical Marxist analysis; and antidiscrimination concepts.145 Civil rights 
leaders chose the legislative route; however, in doing so, they did not 
abandon earlier strategic models based on entreating employers to engage 
in voluntary institutional self-analysis, but now with the specter of law as a 
more effective background threat to persuade them to engage in such 
efforts. Activists asked employers not only to dismantle blatantly 
exclusionary bars to African American employment but also to search for 
and eliminate other unnecessary impediments to increased participation of 
persons of color in their workforces. At this point, the issue of intent was 
by no means foremost in activists’ minds. They sought broad-scale 
progress in hiring and employment advancement as the means for the 
systemic change necessary to reverse a long legacy of structural exclusion.  
The first state to enact legislation banning private-sector employment 
discrimination was New York. Its statute, named the Ives Quinn Act after 
its sponsors, was passed in 1945 as the result of a highly effective coalition 
effort by civil rights, religious, political, and labor groups.146  
1.  The Campaign for Passage of the Ives Quinn Act 
The coalition effort that produced the Ives Quinn Act had three main 
organizational leaders: the NUL, the NAACP, and the American Jewish 
Congress (AJC).147 These organizations were joined by numerous local 
civil rights organizations, including African American, Puerto Rican, and 
Italian groups;148 the CIO; and, ostensibly at least,149 the AFL.150 A broad 
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array of local and national religious organizations and their leaders also 
joined the effort.151  
The campaign took almost a decade. Citizen pressure by way of  
“[f]requent letters and delegations directed toward Albany from New York 
City” led to the creation of the New York State Temporary Commission on 
the Condition of the Urban Colored Population, which documented in 
compelling detail the massive structural employment subordination faced 
by African American workers in the state.152 The commission found that 
“the operation of deliberate as well as unconscious forces [restrict] the 
Negro to certain of the less desirable types of employment and generally 
[bar] him from the more desirable fields,” such as the mercantile and 
financial industries, much factory work, and employment by public 
utilities, insurance companies, and banks.153 African Americans’ attempts 
to move into these desirable occupational fields “have been 
prevented . . . by the opposition of community forces variously 
motivated.”154 The commission concluded that employers’ failure to hire 
African Americans was due more to “indifference” than to personal 
prejudice.155  
Still locked in a Lochner-era mind set, the commission argued that the 
“employment policies of private employers constitute a field not easily 
susceptible to legislative action.”156 Nevertheless, the commission 
proposed thoughtful remedial steps that helped put in motion the broad 
legislative fix it could not yet embrace.157 
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The momentum for a broader legislative fix soon swept past the 
commission with the entry of the United States into World War II.158 
Concerns about ensuring full employment in wartime jobs led several 
Harlem legislators to push for fair employment legislation barring 
discrimination by wartime defense contractors, and the governor 
established a temporary War Council Committee on Discrimination in 
Employment to deal with complaints of job bias. When the war ended the 
commission recommended that it be given permanent status, and hearings 
highlighted the need for comprehensive legislation to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of race and religion by public and private 
employers alike.159 Legal commentators debated the constitutionality of 
such a measure, with supporters suggesting that employers’ Lochnerian 
freedoms from labor regulation had already “been whittled away” by other 
labor regulations and that the public interest in banning discrimination 
outweighed the employer’s liberty interests.160 Opponents fought back with 
their own legal and political arguments, especially claims that the measure 
would intensify, rather than eliminate, discrimination and promote quota 
hiring and promotions.161 
After several years of battle, the Ives Quinn coalition’s coordinated 
political pressure prevailed, and the legislation passed both houses of the 
legislature by impressive margins, after which a supportive governor, the 
liberal Republican Thomas E. Dewey, quickly signed it into law.162  
The text of the Ives Quinn Act defined “[t]he opportunity to obtain 
employment without discrimination because of race, creed, color or 
national origin” as a civil right protected both by the state’s police power 
and state constitution civil rights provisions.163 It explained that the Act 
reached all defined employers, labor organizations, and employment 
agencies.164 In an interesting choice reflecting the recognition that factors 
other than employer prejudice were keeping employees out of jobs, the Act 
defined it as unlawful for employees and other third parties to “aid, abet, 
incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this 
                                                                                                                     
the outcomes of selection processes, and instituting formalized procedures to regulate promotion, 
salary increases, and retention, all with an eye to “bringing to light, and correcting” race 
discrimination problems. Id. at 38, 42–43. Finally, the commission detailed the evidence it had 
collected about discrimination by labor unions, and proposed prosecuting them on unfair labor 
practice theories and possibly enacted new legislation in this area as well. Id. at 71.  
 158. This phase of Ives Quinn’s legislative history is well told by Chen, supra note 148, at 
1242–45. 
 159. See Note, Legislative Attempts to Eliminate Racial and Religious Discrimination, 39 
COLUM. L. REV. 986, 994 (1939).  
 160. Id. at 993. 
 161. On the arguments raised by the bill’s opponents, see generally Chen, supra note 148, at 
1249–51. 
 162. Leo Egan, Anti-Bias Bill Is Passed, 109-32, by Assembly Without Amendment, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1945, at 1; Chen, supra note 148, at 1258 (noting that the Senate margin was 49–6); 
Id. at 1261 (“[Governor] Dewey signed Ives-Quinn into law on March 12, 1945.”). 
 163. 1945 N.Y. Laws 458.  
 164. Id. at 458–59. 
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article.”165 
To implement its provisions, the Act established a new agency, the New 
York State Commission Against Discrimination (SCAD).166 It authorized 
SCAD to conduct investigations and prosecute charges it found to be 
meritorious before an adjudicatory branch in an administrative process.167 
Civil and criminal fines of up to $500 and one year’s imprisonment could 
be imposed for failure to comply with SCAD orders or procedures,168 but 
before SCAD could prosecute violations, the Act required SCAD to 
engage in conciliation, mediation, and other persuasive means to resolve 
any complaint it found justified.169  
The work of giving life to Ives Quinn lay in the enforcement choices of 
regulators. Those choices focused on pushing broad-scale, structural 
change by using law as an incentive-creating backdrop to induce employers 
to self-scrutinize their traditional employment practices. SCAD regulators 
were less keen on case-by-case litigation, a view that would bring them 
into disagreement with civil rights litigators.  
2.  SCAD’s Enforcement Work 
Nothing more graphically demonstrates the historical origins of SCAD 
in the work of the NUL than the transfer of long-time NUL leader Elmer 
Anderson Carter, editor of NUL’s Opportunity magazine, to SCAD’s five-
person commission and eventually to the position of chair.170 Carter, an 
African American, a Republican, and a Harvard University graduate, had 
the credentials to mollify the business community and, at the same time, 
from the perspective of Ives Quinn supporters, was an impressive pick due 
to his long experience as a civil rights leader.171 Carter’s publications 
examining race discrimination in employment demonstrated his 
understanding of the problem he had been appointed to address.172  
Carter perceived the key to Ives Quinn’s potential effectiveness to lie in 
SCAD’s enforcement strategies.173 Consistent with the NUL’s long-
standing philosophy, Carter was a strong advocate of encouraging 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Id. at 461. 
 166. Id. at 459. 
 167. Id. at 461–62. 
 168. Id. at 463–64. 
 169. Id. at 461–62. 
 170. See MORENO, supra note 17, at 116–17, 144.  
 171. Carter Will Head State’s Bias Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1959, at 19; WEISS, supra note 
59, at 232. 
 172. Carter frequently used his editorial seat to survey and critique employer and labor union 
progress on minority employment. See, e.g., Editorial: The Defense Industry, OPPORTUNITY, Oct. 
1941, at 290 (describing some, but not sufficient, improvement in defense-industry minority 
employment); Editorial: Industrial Democracy, OPPORTUNITY, May 1941, at 130 (arguing that 
unions should place race discrimination on par with “other industrial problems”). 
 173. See generally Elmer A. Carter, Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation: Experience Under the New York Law Against Discrimination, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 40 
(1954) (discussing the success of the enforcement of the Ives Quinn Act). 
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voluntary compliance,174 as were the bill’s Republican supporters in the 
state legislature.175 SCAD focused its resources on education and outreach 
campaigns, publishing educational literature and meeting with major 
employer groups to encourage compliance with Ives Quinn’s 
antidiscrimination mandate.176  
According to SCAD reports and some external accounts, employer 
resistance to complying with Ives Quinn was far less than might have been 
expected.177 Statistical reports began to show promising gains within a few 
years in African American women in clerical sales jobs and men in semi-
skilled jobs, with corresponding declines in their concentrations in 
domestic and service occupations.178 
Not all those involved in the enforcement process saw the glass as 
nearly so full, however. In an initiative led by assistant special counsel 
Marian Wynn Perry,179 the NAACP pursued public media campaigns and 
                                                                                                                     
 174. Id. at 41 (describing “tremendous significance in the administration of the new 
statute . . . of individual employers [that] voluntarily abandon previous discriminatory hiring 
practices,” and lauding “business concerns, some of which employ thousands of people” that 
“elected to move swiftly toward compliance without coercion,” including “one of America’s great 
life insurance companies which employed a Negro with exceptional experience in the field of 
human relations as one of its personnel officers to see to it that hitherto excluded groups would 
have a fair chance”); see also id. at 50 (stating his view that the only hope for elimination of 
“pandemic” discrimination in the United States “lies in the extent to which voluntary compliance 
with the provisions of the law can be achieved”). 
 175. See, e.g., Ives Sees Promise in Anti-Bias Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1945, at 15 (reporting 
on Republican Assembly leader Irving Ives’ speech to the Citizens Committee on Harlem warning 
that frequent use of the penalties available under the Act would “indicate ‘that something is 
fundamentally wrong’ which the law cannot correct,” and stating his opinion that the objectives of 
“‘conference, conciliation and persuasion’” could be attained “through ‘united community effort’”). 
 176. See N.Y. STATE COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, ANNUAL REPORT 13–14 (1946) 
(describing SCAD’s broadly targeted education campaign aimed at inducing voluntary compliance). 
 177. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 173, at 41–42. Carter claimed that “[w]ithin an incredibly 
short time Negro men and women began to appear in the personnel of companies that never before 
had employed them,” and he argued that this was because the Act “gave to employers who perhaps 
had harbored a genuine desire to end discriminatory hiring practices a rationale which was 
unassailable. To their questioning or disapproving colleagues or to a resentful labor force they 
could say, this is the law.” Id. at 42; see also BIONDI, supra note 147, at 98 (noting that SCAD 
advertised with pride during its first decade that “it had not forced compliance in a single 
instance”).  
 178. See, e.g., Morroe Berger, The New York State Law Against Discrimination: Operation 
and Administration, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 747, 792 (1950). Berger reported that, whereas in 1940 64% 
of working African American women in New York City were in domestic service and 40% of men 
were in service occupations, by 1947, these proportions had declined to 36% and 23%, respectively. 
Id. These changes were the result of a variety of factors, including not only Ives Quinn but also the 
federal wartime FEPC and war-related labor demands. Id.; see also REED, supra note 120, at 163 
(describing improvements in employment statistics that the Urban League of Greater New York 
attributed to its work and SCAD’s work).  
 179. Perry, a 1943 Brooklyn Law School graduate, had been secretary of the Constitutional 
Liberties Committee of the New York National Lawyers’ Guild. NAACP Legal Director Thurgood 
Marshall met her during the campaign for Ives Quinn and hired her to handle employment and 
housing discrimination cases in New York, including litigation over recruitment and hiring 
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enforcement actions where it viewed SCAD as doing too little.180 The 
NAACP filed letters with the agency, protesting an insufficient volume of 
litigated cases. The social action committee of the AJC pitched in to help 
conduct a survey of employment agencies specializing in white collar jobs, 
which found that only about one quarter were complying with the new 
law.181 Another joint initiative of the NAACP, Urban League of Greater 
New York, and AJC sought to hire a full-time professional to “stimulate 
the filing” of SCAD complaints, especially “test cases” aimed at “large 
employers, strategic industries or job classifications, or novel questions of 
law.”182 This project, the organizations announced, had the goal of 
“test[ing] employer compliance with the law by stimulating, [sic] large 
scale applications from minority groups,” to allow a statistical showing 
that employers could not have the pretext that arises for individuals.183 
NAACP Secretary Walter White lambasted the agency for long delays in 
processing cases and for spending too much time on press releases and 
pamphlets rather than on “attacking discrimination at its roots.”184 
SCAD and the NAACP continued to argue about enforcement strategies 
for many years, but they also sometimes collaborated on the development 
of new initiatives and case theories. These collaborations sometimes 
resulted in prototypical disparate impact cases, decades before Griggs. 
SCAD, for example, investigated race discrimination complaints sent by 
the NAACP involving hiring and promotions by General Motors, including 
the absence of African American foremen and office workers. On 
investigation, SCAD found “‘certainly not the kind of compliance which 
                                                                                                                     
practices of contractors involved in construction of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel. See MARK V. 
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936– 
1961, at 35, 46 (1994); PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Group II, Box A 457, folders entitled “New York 
State Commission Against Discrimination, 1945–46 & 1947–53” (Library of Congress) (containing 
various correspondence to and from Perry regarding Ives Quinn and NAACP enforcement efforts); 
BIONDI, supra note 147, at 102–04 (describing Perry’s work). For more on the NAACP’s work on 
Ives Quinn, see Risa Lauren Goluboff, “Let Economic Equality Take Care of Itself”: The NAACP, 
Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1416–17 
(2005). 
 180. See, e.g., Lax Enforcement of Job Law Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1949, at 48 (reporting 
that the Committee to Support the Ives Quinn Act worked out of the headquarters of the Harlem 
Urban League, where a paid secretary recorded discrimination cases and aided complainants in 
filing charges, and that the NAACP, League and AJC had charged that SCAD was not processing 
enough cases); Berger, supra note 178, at 785–86 (further describing activities of Committee to 
Support the Ives Quinn Act).  
 181. See Letter from Edward Lawson, to Marian Perry, NAACP (Feb. 26, 1946), located at 
PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Group II, Box A 457, folders titled “New York State Commission Against 
Discrimination 1945–46” (Library of Congress). 
 182. Press Release, NAACP, A Project to Promote Better Enforcement of the New York Ives-
Quinn Law (Jan. 19, 1948), located at PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Group II, Box A 457, folders titled 
“New York State Commission Against Discrimination 1947–53” (Library of Congress).  
 183. Id. 
 184. Statement of Walter White, NAACP Secretary, re SCAD (Jan. 22, 1946), located at 
PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Group II, Box A 457, folders titled “New York State Commission Against 
Discrimination, 1945–46” (Library of Congress). 
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one would hope for in a giant industrial organization which is so much the 
symbol of American genius and enterprise,’” and “recommended that the 
company broaden its recruitment base for white collar jobs.”185  
Another initiative concerned a building trades apprenticeship program 
that had previously excluded African Americans.186 SCAD worked with 
New York University (NYU) to develop a pen-and-pencil test to select an 
apprentice class, only to find that this test had a severe disparate impact, 
with only one African American of sixty-five obtaining a passing score. 
For the next apprenticeship class, SCAD directed NYU to redesign the test; 
this time, the pass rate for African Americans and Puerto Ricans turned out 
to be a far more acceptable eleven out of thirty-three.187  
In still another years-long initiative, SCAD worked with labor and 
community groups to encourage New York’s vast hotel industry, an 
employer of many African Americans, to develop more white-collar jobs 
for them. SCAD persuaded employers to set up on-the-job training 
programs to prepare African American entry-level workers for such jobs, 
as well as to fund an industry-wide committee on employment and 
promotional opportunities, administered by paid staff charged with 
carrying out an “action plan.”188 
The hotel industry became the locus of a disparate impact case when 
Shellman Johnson, an experienced African American hotel worker, filed a 
complaint against an “East Side hotel” that maintained a policy of 
considering for employment only applicants with at least five years of 
experience in another east side hotel.189 SCAD pursued the case before an 
investigating commissioner on a theory that emphasized the policy’s effect. 
As the final opinion pointed out, because few if any African Americans 
had the requisite five years of “east side experience,” such a rule “can only 
be considered a prohibition against the employment of Negroes.”190 
In its first decades, SCAD rarely litigated in court—a strategy that, as 
one historian has pointed out, left the way open for SCAD to develop what 
was clearly a disparate impact approach to its mission.191 When SCAD did 
litigate, it did so in a seemingly carefully chosen case involving religious 
discrimination, where it succeeded in obtaining helpful precedent that 
blurred the line between intent and effects theories of discrimination. The 
                                                                                                                     
 185. MORENO, supra note 17, at 129. 
 186. See State of N.Y. EXEC. DEP’T, N.Y. STATE COMM’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Annual Report 
1965, at 20 (1965) (discussing a case involving the Sheet Metal Workers Union). 
 187. Id. at 20–21. 
 188. Id. at 22–24. 
 189. Determination After Investigation at 1–2, Johnson v. Ritz Assocs., Inc, C-12750-66 (on 
file with author); see also George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair 
Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. 
L. REV. 1598, 1601 (1969) (including a discussion of the facts of this case by law professors who 
helped formulate the case theory in Griggs). 
 190. Determination After Investigation, supra note 189, at 2. 
 191. See, e.g., MORENO, supra note 17, at 117 (“[B]y staying out of court, the SCAD left the 
door open for the disparate-impact standard of discrimination, since the disparate-treatment formula 
was not tested and articulated in case law.”).  
2011] SOCIAL MOVEMENT HISTORY 283 
 
Court of Appeals of New York affirmed a finding of discrimination on the 
basis of religion, based solely on a prospective employer’s persistent 
inquiry into an applicant’s maiden name, noting that employers “intent on 
violating the Law Against Discrimination” were likely to pursue such 
practices “in ways that are devious, by methods subtle and elusive.”192  
The New York Court of Appeals’ sensitivity to the difficulties of 
proving intentional discrimination reflected an ongoing discussion among 
observers and activists about how to interpret Ives Quinn’s mandate. The 
statute’s enactment represented a major development, and it therefore 
garnered much discussion among experts in business, labor relations, and 
law. Many of the hot-button issues still debated in the field surfaced for the 
first time in this discourse. One of these, not surprisingly, involved the 
question of intent. On this there was no need to start afresh because similar 
issues had already arisen in implementing the unfair labor practice 
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibited 
discrimination against employees for exercising their protected rights 
under that Act.193 The National Labor Relations Board and the courts were 
developing standards of proof for detecting discriminatory intent194 that 
could guide interpretation of Ives Quinn as well. The idea that proof of 
intentional discrimination sufficed to establish an unlawful act under Ives 
Quinn thus was never an issue; the big question was instead whether 
intentional discrimination was necessary to establish a violation.195 Here, 
the policy objectives of the NLRA and Ives Quinn were not necessarily the 
same, and commentators began a heated debate about this question, which 
became more urgent as Ives Quinn became the model for proposed federal 
employment antidiscrimination legislation. 196 As often happens today, the 
                                                                                                                     
 192. Holland v. Edwards, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. 1954).  
 193. See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (defining as an unfair 
labor practice “discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization”).  
 194. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29, 45–46 (1937) 
(describing the task of determining whether an employer’s true motive was an unlawful or 
legitimate one); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 131–32 (1937) (sorting between 
employer’s “ostensible reason” and actual reason for an employee’s discharge). 
 195. One insightful commentator, writing in 1949, argued that “discrimination may exist 
independently of malice or intention to discriminate,” noting that “SCAD has held that while 
intention to discriminate is not an essential element of a violation of the Anti-Discrimination Law, 
the good faith of the respondent will be considered in determining” the remedy. Note, An American 
Legal Dilemma—Proof of Discrimination, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 107, 109 & n.10 (1949) (citing 1948 
SCAD Annual Report). This author also presciently analyzed the potential uses of statistical 
evidence and burden shifting devices, offering proposals much like those the courts would develop 
in later decades. See, e.g., id. at 110 (“The question arises . . . whether the law in dealing with cases 
of group discrimination may make use of an inductive process [using statistics] similar to that used 
by the sociologist.”); id. at 124–25 (“[I]t would seem that if a job applicant could show . . . that he 
possessed the objective qualifications for the job in question, the burden could reasonably be placed 
on the employer to justify his actions . . . .”). 
 196. See, e.g., id. at 109 & n.10 (noting SCAD’s position in 1948 that intent was not an 
essential element); MORENO, supra note 17, at 114 n.10 (noting similar statements in SCAD reports 
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question of whether intent was necessary to establish a violation of the Act 
became enmeshed in analytically muddy ways with related issues, such as 
the weight to give evidence of statistical disparities, the relevance of 
discriminatory effects, the threat of “quota” requirements, employers’ 
obligations to engage in “affirmative action,”197 and the like.  
Also like today’s debates, commentary assessing the operation of Ives 
Quinn tended to fall into two “camps,” one championing a greater reach for 
the Act and the other arguing for reining in the Act’s interpretation. One 
progressive labor expert argued that SCAD’s enforcement policy should 
recognize “that the most important matter is not the settlement of 
individual cases but the opening of new job opportunities for members of 
minority groups.”198 Another scholar worried about “novel attempts at 
evasion or subterfuge,” and argued for the benefits of an administrative 
approach to investigation and enforcement because “such provisions are 
not penal” and thus “can also be construed broadly.”199 Writing prior to 
what they hoped would be the success of national legislative efforts, two 
other professors presented a comprehensive articulation of the 
discrimination caused by unnecessary educational and job requirements, 
which, they argued, meant that “almost no change in racial employment 
patterns could occur.”200  
On the opposite side of the question, more conservative commentators 
argued for an intent-based standard.201 This debate was by no means 
resolved in the 1950s (nor, indeed, has been resolved to this day), but what 
is clear on historical examination, as even disparate impact foe Paul 
Moreno acknowledges, is that “[t]he idea of systemic or ‘institutional’ 
racism and discrimination, although not yet clearly articulated, was present 
                                                                                                                     
from 1950 and 1951); id. at 135, 144 (noting shifts in SCAD’s orientation through the 1950s as the 
civil rights movement heated up).  
 197. This term had different connotations at the time, related not to the grant of racial 
preferences but to the taking of proactive steps to remedy violations of law. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) 
(1940) (granting the NLRB the power “to take such affirmative action including [ordering] 
reinstatement of employees . . . as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]”). The current debate 
about affirmative action often forgets these remedy-based aspects that remain fully consistent with 
the term’s earliest uses. 
 198. Berger, supra note 178, at 795.  
 199. Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statues: Some Proposals, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 
1117–18 (1964). 
 200. PAUL H. NORGREN & SAMUEL E. HILL, TOWARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT 20 (1964). Indeed, this 
treatise, published prior to Title VII’s enactment, frequently and clearly articulated the concepts 
underlying disparate impact doctrine. See, e.g., id. at 23 (“[L]ess overt practices . . . can be used to 
exclude Negroes from employment opportunities almost as effectively as Southern practices.”); id. 
at 27 (noting the importance of the problem of “simple inertia,” and adding that, “Traditional racial 
employment patterns tend to persist for long periods of time unless there is a conscious decision on 
the part of top management to move in the direction of an integrated work force . . . .”). 
 201. See, e.g., Arnold H. Sutin, The Experience of State Fair Employment Commissions: A 
Comparative Study, 18 VAND. L. REV. 965, 993–94 (1965) (writing by southern business school 
professor with suggestions about implementation of Title VII, including that it be confined to 
intentional discrimination and avoid “quota arguments” made under the SCAD system). 
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in antidiscrimination thinking in the 1950s.”202  
What was also clear by the early 1960s was the permanence of state 
private-sector employment  antidiscrimination edicts. By 1963, half of the 
states in the nation had enacted such laws.203 Illinois, one of the last states 
to enact this legislation,204 quickly generated an effects-based case that 
would soon gain notoriety in the debates on Title VII. That case, decided in 
1963, involved Motorola’s rejection of Leon Myart’s job application for an 
electrician’s position. Motorola claimed that it had rejected Mr. Myart for 
this job because he had failed a general aptitude test, but was unable to 
produce his test score. When the Illinois Fair Employment Practice (FEP) 
Commission administered the test to Mr. Myart, he obtained a passing 
score.205 The first ground for the Illinois FEP Commission hearing 
examiner’s ruling against Motorola thus involved his finding of pretext. As 
an alternate ground, the hearing examiner noted that Mr. Myart’s extensive 
vocational training and work experience as an electrician clearly 
established that he possessed strong qualifications for the job, and the 
evidence in the record further showed that the general aptitude test 
Motorola claimed to have administered was both “obsolete” and did not “lend 
itself to equal opportunity to qualify for . . . disadvantaged groups.”206 
Before Congress, the Motorola case, garbled as to its facts and grossly 
distorted as to its holding, became the conservative bugaboo about how far 
Title VII could reach.207 In the end, both conservatives and liberals 
approved after revision an amendment offered by Senator John Tower that 
authorized at least some types of “professionally developed” employment 
testing.208 This language left open the critical question of whether such 
tests had to adhere to professional norms as to how to measure relevant job 
performance criteria. It also in no way addressed the use of employment 
practices other than testing. These ambiguities left ample room for civil 
rights activists and the EEOC to push the theory of disparate impact 
analysis farther.  
With Title VII’s final enactment, the focus of further development of 
disparate impact theory shifted primarily to the federal level. Again, an 
interaction between civil rights activists, primarily from the NAACP and 
the LDF, and responsible regulating agencies, especially but not 
                                                                                                                     
 202. MORENO, supra note 17, at 126.  
 203. See CHEN, supra note 40, at 118 tbl.4.1 (listing twenty-five state FEP statutes passed 
before Title VII was enacted and their dates of passage). 
 204. See CHEN, supra note 40, at 154–55 (discussing efforts in Illinois to pass FEP legislation). 
 205. Myart v. Motorola, Inc., No. 63C-127 (Ill. Fair Empl. Prac. Comm. 1964), reproduced in 
110 CONG. REC. 5312–14 (1964). 
 206. Id. at 5313. 
 207. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 11,251 (1964) (statement of Sen. Tower expressing concern 
that Motorola case might lead the EEOC to “regulate the use of tests by employers”). 
 208. This amendment provides that it is not “an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such 
test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate 
because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 257 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006)). 
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exclusively the EEOC, pushed forward a “good cop, bad cop” approach. 
E.  A Federal Antidiscrimination Edict for the Private Employment 
Sector 
1.  Federal Executive Order Enforcement 
At the same time that states were developing an employment 
discrimination jurisprudence that included disparate impact analysis, 
government officials working at the federal level under Presidential 
Executive Orders were also experimenting with goals and timetables for 
increasing minority hiring rather than merely seeking to ferret out 
individual discriminatory acts.209 There is ample historical literature on 
these federal programs, so I will not discuss them here, except to point out 
that at the federal administrative level as well, so-called “group based,” 
institution-wide, or structural approaches to solving the problem of racial 
employment subordination were well entrenched in the relevant public 
actors’ discourse.  
In short, by the early 1960s the discourse that was developing through 
the enforcement of employment antidiscrimination edicts at both the state 
and national levels emphasized broad interpretation of antidiscrimination 
mandates to address all aspects of a multi-faceted problem.210 Civil rights 
groups “now argued that the problem of discrimination in employment 
was more complicated, deeply rooted, and structural,” and not so much a 
problem of “blatant exclusion, but of business practices that reinforced the 
effects of past exclusion.”211  
To be sure, at this point, intent versus impact tests for employment 
discrimination had not yet been carved into sharply distinct theories. But 
this was not because civil rights activists or government officials had yet to 
conjure up the idea of effects-based discrimination. The idea that both 
invidious and neutral employment practices could cause discrimination 
was familiar to both public officials and activists seeking solutions to 
                                                                                                                     
 209. See CHEN, supra note 40, at 231 (describing these efforts under various Executive 
Orders). See generally LOUIS RUCHAMES, RACE, JOBS, & POLITICS: THE STORY OF FEPC (1953) 
(presenting a classic history of the Fair Employment Practice Commissions (FEPCs) organized 
under these Executive Orders); Boris, supra note 40 (exploring the work of these federal FEPCs). 
 210. See, e.g., Robert A. Girard & Louis L. Jaffe, Some General Observations on 
Administration of State Fair Employment Practice Laws, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 114, 116 (1964) 
(“Commissions should strive to induce those controlling job opportunities . . . to abandon frequent 
unnecessary tests and requirements . . . .”); Herman Schwartz, Discussion Summary, 14 BUFF. L. 
REV. 126, 128 (1964) (noting the employer view that, “[T]here was very little overt employer 
discrimination on the part of top management; tradition is the real problem . . . .”); Henry Spitz, 
Tailoring the Techniques to Eliminate and Prevent Employment Discrimination, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 
79, 81 (1964) (noting comments by the New York Commission for Human Rights General Counsel 
that, “History, custom, usage and countless other factors have built barriers into the system which 
may not have been motivated by prejudice in their inception, yet today constitute effective 
roadblocks . . . .”). 
 211. MORENO, supra note 17, at 199–200. 
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structural racial subordination.212  
The rigid doctrinal separation of intent and effects-based tests for 
discrimination would occur in the Court’s important 1972 opinion in 
Washington v. Davis,213 where it rejected the lower courts’ application of 
the Griggs test for disparate impact in a case challenging a police 
department’s use of written employment tests under the Equal Protection 
Clause. Before that, in the words of LDF’s leading employment 
discrimination litigator Robert Belton, who would serve as LDF’s lead 
counsel in Griggs, “[i]t was all discrimination [to us].”214 
By the time the House Education and Labor Committee reported out 
fair employment practices bills in 1961 and 1963, structural or effects-
based conceptions of employment discrimination were well entrenched in 
the public discourse, though the legislative record leaves unclear precisely 
how such arguments were understood by both those legislators who 
supported and those who opposed the legislation that finally passed in 
Congress in 1964. I will not rehash the arguments about whether Congress 
intended to approve disparate impact analysis when it enacted Title VII; 
the inconclusive evidence has been evaluated by many others who have 
reached opposing conclusions.215  
But another important aspect of the legislative history of Congress’s 
passage of Title VII does require brief mention here because of the way it 
shaped the subsequent complementary enforcement efforts of the EEOC 
NAACP, and LDF in the early years after the statute’s enactment. The final 
compromise measure Congress enacted into law as Title VII newly 
created the EEOC, but at the same time stripped it of all the litigating 
authority it had been granted under earlier versions of the bill modeled 
after the Ives Quinn Act.216 As one commentator put it, the EEOC 
                                                                                                                     
 212. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 232–33 
(1968) (recommending that public and private employers remove “artificial barriers to employment 
and promotion”). The Commission explained:  
Racial discrimination and unrealistic and unnecessarily high minimum 
qualifications for employment or promotion often have the same prejudicial 
effect. . . .  
Present recruitment procedures should be reexamined. Testing procedures 
should be revalidated or replaced by work sample or actual job tryouts. . . . These 
procedures have already been initiated in the steel and telephone industries.  
Id. 
 213. 426 U.S. 229, 232–33, 239, 241–42 (1972). 
 214. See Selmi, supra note 15, at 723 & n.89. 
 215. See supra note 17 (summarizing literature on this question). The 1991 Civil Rights Act, 
which inserted explicit statutory language embracing the Griggs disparate impact approach, renders 
moot questions concerning Congress’s initial statutory intent. See Peter M. Leibold et al., Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: Race to the Finish—Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1043, 1043–44, 1058, 1084–1086 (1993) (noting, in article by counsel to the 
bill’s sponsors, that the 1991 Act explicitly codifies the Griggs disparate impact test). 
 216. See Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection 
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was constituted as a “‘poor enfeebled thing’”217 with authority only to 
investigate and attempt to conciliate discrimination charges levied against 
private employers but no authority to back up such efforts through 
enforcement in the courts.  
This scheme obviously had an enormous impact on the EEOC’s 
enforcement strategies, until the 1972 amendments gave litigation authority 
to the EEOC in private-sector cases. Republican champions of weak EEOC 
powers may have hoped to gut Title VII’s effectiveness in this manner, but 
the regulatory context they produced was more interesting than that 
because it ended up encouraging collaboration between the EEOC and civil 
rights lawyers from the NAACP and LDF. The EEOC carried forward the 
experimentalist tradition pioneered in SCAD’s prior work in encouraging 
employers to open more employment opportunities to traditionally 
excluded outsiders while the NAACP and LDF threatened aggressive 
litigation against recalcitrant employers who failed to play along with the 
EEOC’s voluntarist agenda.  
2.  Early Title VII Enforcement: EEOC and NAACP 
Complementary Efforts 
Few historians would dispute that activists and agency staff deeply 
steeped in the traditions of the civil rights movement brought the ideas of 
the movement with them as they sought to give life to Title VII. In so 
doing, they acted much like a prior generation of activists and government 
agency representatives had in implementing the Ives Quinn Act in New 
York State. Early 1960s actors at the federal level included EEOC staff 
member Sonia Pressman Fuentes, whom some credit with the authorship of 
disparate impact doctrine within the EEOC.218 EEOC Chief of Conciliation 
Alfred W. Blumrosen was another 1960s EEOC staffer who articulated the 
                                                                                                                     
of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 433 (2005). 
 217. Id. (quoting MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT 205 (1966)). 
 218. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 17, at 244–45 (describing an EEOC memo authored by 
Pressman discussing the use of statistical evidence). Of course, to an employment discrimination 
law expert, the use of statistical evidence and disparate impact analysis are not coterminous 
concepts, since statistical evidence is also important in intent-based “pattern or practice” cases. See, 
e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339–40 (1977) (discussing important 
role of statistics in pattern or practice cases). I have not been able to verify the claim that Pressman 
was first to articulate the disparate impact theory within the EEOC. Pressman had been a staff 
member at the NLRB and founder of the National Organization for Women, and thus had ample 
background and theoretical sophistication in discrimination concepts. In oral histories, however, she 
concentrates on her role in convincing the EEOC to take sex discrimination seriously. See, e.g., 
Interview with Sonia Pressman Fuentes, Founder, National Organization for Women (Dec. 27, 
1990), available at http://www.utoronto.ca/wjudaism/contemporary/articles/history_eeoc.htm. The 
issue of authorship of the disparate impact concept within the EEOC is inconsequential in any event 
because, as I have shown, no one within the EEOC needed to “invent” disparate impact theory at all 
since the concept pre-dated the agency’s creation. 
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concepts underlying disparate impact theory.219 Other key players in the 
early interpretation of disparate impact doctrine under Title VII were 
litigators for the NAACP, including Robert Belton, who played a major 
role for LDF in employment cases220 and was counsel in Griggs,221 and 
Jack Greenberg, LDF general counsel, who argued Griggs before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.222 Law professors George Cooper and Richard Sobol also 
made important contributions.223 All have recounted the key place of 
Griggs in LDF’s strategy in building on Brown v. Board of Education to 
attack what the organization viewed as a next major priority in dismantling 
structural racial subordination.224 
The early days of implementation of Title VII bore analogies to the 
implementation of SCAD, not only in the sharing of perspectives between 
government agents and activists but also in the synergies produced by 
complementary enforcement efforts. The EEOC immediately began to 
encourage broad-scale reform across targeted industrial sectors, much as 
the New York SCAD had done but with broader national authority. In its 
early internally authored history, the EEOC reported with pride on its 
campaigns to induce broad voluntary dismantling of discriminatory barriers 
to African American employment, which it aimed especially at carefully 
targeted employment sectors in the South.225  
According to this EEOC account, when it opened for business, the 
Commission found itself flooded with far more discrimination charges than 
it had anticipated.226 Most of these charges came from southern states and 
involved race discrimination, and “[o]ver one-third of them were 
stimulated by the NAACP, whose prime concern was with getting cases in 
a posture to take to court.”227 This EEOC account corresponds with the 
                                                                                                                     
 219. See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV 465, 503 (1968) (arguing that some “objective tests are ‘carriers,’ 
which translate discrimination in education into discrimination in employment”); Alfred W. 
Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment 
Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 59–61 (1972) (discussing his attempt as first EEOC Chief of 
Conciliations to negotiate a model agreement on employment testing and the subsequent 
development of the EEOC’s disparate impact employment testing guidelines). 
 220. See GREENBERG, supra note 46, at 447 (describing Belton’s role). 
 221. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 515 F.2d 86, 87 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 222. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 223. See generally Cooper & Sobol, supra note 189 (outlining disparate impact theory). 
 224. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private 
Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. LOUIS L.J. 225, 246 (noting the importance of 
Griggs); GREENBERG, supra note 46, at 443 (describing the impact of the Griggs campaign as 
“almost on a par with the campaign that won Brown”). 
 225. Part II, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Administrative History, 
microformed on Civil Rights During the Johnson Administration, 1936–1969, Reel 1, Slides 119–
69 (Steven F. Lawson ed., 1984) [hereinafter Administrative History].  
 226. Id. at 105–06. 
 227. Id. at 106. 
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recollections of key players within the NAACP, who confirm that their 
strategy was to force cases to court.228  
The Commission found itself internally divided over whether 
enforcement through the courts was preferable to investing efforts into 
obtaining voluntary plans by employers, but in the end, it found itself so 
swamped with work that workload alone “made academic . . . the debate 
going on both inside and outside the Commission on the most desirable 
approach for eliminating employment discrimination.”229 The EEOC thus 
called for discussions with attorneys from the NAACP and LDF and 
obtained an agreement from them “to concentrate on the quality 
of . . . charges rather than on quantity so that the charges would be as 
strong as possible when they came to the Commission.”230  
With the NAACP and LDF focused on finding and developing cases 
with strong facts, the Commission concentrated its efforts on negotiating 
complex and far reaching conciliation agreements, which it viewed as its 
first “landmark” accomplishments.231 Some of these cases reflect the 
agency’s experimentation with disparate impact analysis.232 One case, 
which the NAACP developed and the Commission then pursued, involved 
the nation’s largest shipbuilder, the Norfolk, Virginia, Newport News 
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company. The Commission’s 1966 conciliation 
agreement with that employer, which it billed as “the most extensive and 
detailed agreement ever negotiated in the field of employment 
discrimination up to the time,” had as its “most significant aspect” 
Newport News’s agreement to retain the services of an outside expert “to 
review its industrial relations system and to make changes in its wage and 
promotion system” to open up more opportunities for African American 
workers.233 
Another landmark agreement involved Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical 
Corporation and its associated union, which jointly agreed to replace their 
collectively bargained position-based seniority system with a plant-wide 
system that would increase promotion opportunities for African American 
workers by allowing them to bid into higher paid jobs. This, the EEOC 
proudly explained, “was the first agreement to make an inroad into the 
problems created when seniority systems are used, intentionally or 
                                                                                                                     
 228. For a description of the NAACP and LDF strategy in filing these complaints, see 
GREENBERG, supra note 46, at 413 (“The complaints focused on areas of large black population, 
high black unemployment, and industrial growth.”); id. at 414–15 (“[LDF targeted] semiskilled and 
skilled blue-collar jobs, which paid well but didn’t require much formal education. . . . and 
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices, mainly, testing, unnecessary high school diploma 
requirements, and word of mouth recruiting.”). The LDF focused on litigation and distrusted “timid 
bureaucrats.” Belton, supra note 224, at 229–30. The NAACP’s labor director similarly argued that 
state FEP agencies had failed. See Herbert Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice 
Commissions: A Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 22, 23 (1964). 
 229. Administrative History, supra note 225, at 129–30. 
 230. Id. at 106. 
 231. Id. at 119–20. 
 232. Id. at 248. 
 233. Id. at 120–21. 
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inadvertently, as a means of perpetuating race discrimination.”234  
The EEOC also undertook public hearings to “prod[] employers to 
institute affirmative action programs designed to broaden opportunities for 
minority group members.”235 The Commission decided to concentrate on 
the southern textile industry, with the goal of steering the EEOC into a 
“broader” or “‘wholesale’ approach of industry-wide antidiscrimination 
programs” as opposed to “case-by-case ‘retail’ handling of complaints by 
individuals.”236 EEOC officials, including Blumrosen, planned an event, 
which they decided to call a “forum” rather than a hearing to make it less 
legalistic, over a two-day period in Charlotte, North Carolina, and then 
initiated a “cooperative follow-up program” with “representatives of the 
Carolinas’ textile industry” to search for ways to “open new job 
opportunities for minority members.”237 These efforts produced multiple 
“changes in employment patterns” that reportedly led to measurable 
increases in jobs for African Americans in the mills.238 
Another aspect of this program involved EEOC representatives’ visits 
to mills “to review hiring, promotion, and job classification” systems.239 
The EEOC helped coordinate recruitment drives that produced new 
applicants, and “pointed out subtle forms of discrimination on the lower 
supervisory levels which management was not aware existed.”240 It sought 
changes based squarely on disparate impact analysis, as in the following 
situation:  
In one city, the president of a textile firm organized a meeting 
between seven of his plant managers and Commission 
representatives to discuss screening methods for applicants 
and existing testing procedures to determine if they were job-
related and validated or simply a matter of custom. As a 
result . . . plant managers decided to discard the tests and to 
develop new ones with greater relevance to job openings.241 
                                                                                                                     
 234. Id. at 122–23 (emphasis added). The issue of bona fide seniority systems’ effects in 
perpetuating former discrimination is an important topic in its own right, but I do not focus on it 
here in order to avoid further complicating my narrative about the development of disparate impact 
doctrine. For a good discussion of this issue from the 1960s, see Cooper & Sobol, supra note 189, 
at 1601–31; see also Belton, supra note 224, at 242–43 (noting that decisions considering the 
discriminatory effects of seniority systems contributed to the development of disparate impact 
doctrine). 
 235. Administrative History, supra note 225, at 130. 
 236. Id. at 137. 
 237. Id. at 137–38, 144.  
 238. Id. (noting that, over the time period, new African American hires in the mills represented 
41% of all new hires). 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. at 144–45.  
 241. Id. (emphasis added). Another aspect of the Commission’s early work involved thinking 
through the meaning and significance of the Tower amendment and the Mansfield-Dirksen 
compromise package’s inclusion of an amendment to § 706(g) that added the term “intentionally” to 
the statute’s relief provisions. Id. at 249. The Commission saw little concern with the Tower 
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The Commission undertook a similar initiative in another major 
southern employment sector, the private utilities industry, where EEOC 
data showed that “minority participation rates were lowest of any” in the 
nation’s major industries.242 The Commission subsequently undertook an 
initiative patterned after its success in the Carolinas’ textile industry, 
planning to visit twenty southern cities to encourage voluntary self-analysis 
and development of steps to increase minority hiring and advancement.243 
It was from a recalcitrant employer in this industrial sector that the Griggs 
litigation arose.  
3.  Developing the Case Theory in Griggs 
The facts in Griggs involved a southern private utility that was 
unwilling to play ball with the EEOC. Duke Power decided to introduce 
intelligence testing and a high school diploma requirement for unskilled 
jobs at the eve of Title VII’s effective date, thus raising the distinct 
possibility that its actions were motivated by invidious intent. The facts 
were probably not strong enough to support a verdict on this theory in a 
southern court, however. Duke Power argued that it had acted in good faith 
and pointed to facts such as its willingness to pay for employee education 
programs to support its position.244 The NAACP and LDF therefore filed a 
class action complaint on behalf of thirteen named plaintiffs on a disparate 
impact theory in 1966,245 though the case would not reach the U.S. 
Supreme Court until half a decade later.  
The Griggs plaintiffs lost before the district court,246 but Griggs was 
not the only case of its kind litigated in the immediate aftermath of Title 
                                                                                                                     
amendment, explaining that “[v]ery early in its history” it had “found reason to believe” that some 
ability and aptitude tests were contributing to the “maintenance of racially discriminatory 
employment patterns.” Id. at 232. After study, it had promulgated guidelines in 1966 calling for 
“objective standards for selection screening and promotion of workers,” with a “special emphasis 
on job analysis, recruitment, screening and interviewing related to job requirements, and test 
selection on the basis of job-related criteria.” Id. at 234. The Commission further explained that it 
had concluded that it was an unlawful practice to fail to hire or limit employees “on criteria which 
prove to have a demonstrable racial effect without clear and convincing business motive.” Id. at 
248. It acknowledged that this reading of the statute could not easily be squared with the Mansfield-
Dirksen § 706(g) amendment and that a further working out of the issue among the courts, 
Congress, and the Commission would be required. Id. at 249. Close inspection thus does not 
support Graham’s assertion that the EEOC simply sought to rewrite or ignore the legislative history 
of the Act. See GRAHAM, supra note 17, at 250 (citing the EEOC’s internally authored 
administrative history to support the proposition that “the agency was prepared to defy Title VII’s 
restrictions”). 
 242. Administrative History, supra note 225, at 164–65. More specifically, only 3.7% of 
employees at these utility companies were African American, and almost half of these companies 
employed no African Americans at all. Id. at 168.  
 243. Id. at 169. 
 244. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427–28, 432 (emphasizing absence of a 
dispute by the courts in the case about the employer’s absence of bad intent).  
 245. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 243–44 (M.D.N.C. 1968). 
 246. Id. at 244. 
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VII’s enactment. Several cases on disparate impact or effects theory were 
in the litigation pipeline before Griggs reached the U.S. Supreme Court. A 
case filed in California alleged that an employer’s policy against hiring 
applicants with records of minor arrests but no convictions violated Title 
VII on the grounds that African Americans were far more likely to face 
arrests for minor alleged transgressions.247 The district court upheld the 
plaintiffs’ theory, finding that their evidence of disparate impact was 
“overwhelming and utterly convincing” and that the employer had failed to 
show any business necessity for its policy.248 The court concluded that the 
employer’s policy constituted unlawful discrimination “even though such a 
policy is objectively and fairly applied as between applicants of various 
races” because it caused “substantial and disproportionate[]” exclusion of 
African Americans from employment opportunities.249  
In another case, which arose out of Louisiana with NAACP counsel 
representation, the district court accepted a similar theory in a challenge to 
a paper plant operator that had instituted new I.Q. testing requirements 
between 1963 and 1964 to determine job eligibility and transfers for 
unskilled employment positions.250 The court found the employer’s action 
illegal where the evidence showed that it had adopted the tests with no 
professional study and no attention to their relevance in measuring actual 
job requirements.251 
In another complex “pattern and practice” case pursued by the Justice 
Department, an Ohio federal district court found that a union’s 
administration of a competency exam for electricians was unlawful where 
forty-one of forty-four presently employed members had failed it and these 
dismal passage rates could be expected to “chill” African American 
applications for union membership.252  
Courts in other cases from Massachusetts,253 California,254 Missouri255 
                                                                                                                     
 247. Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id.  
 250. Hicks v. Crown Zellerback Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314, 316, 319 (E.D. La. 1970). These 
counsel were George Cooper and Richard Sobol, authors of a key article articulating the disparate 
impact theory of discrimination, Cooper & Sobol, supra note 189, who assisted LDF on 
employment cases for many years. See GREENBERG, supra note 46, at 418–19. 
 251. Hicks, 319 F. Supp. at 319.  
 252. Dobbins v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413, 433 (S.D. Ohio 1968), 
modified on other grounds, 1969 WL 120 (S.D. Ohio 1969).  
 253. Arrington v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. Mass. 1969) (finding 
that plaintiffs likely would succeed on the merits in a challenge to general aptitude tests for transit 
authority drivers and collectors where the employer offered no evidence of the tests’ relevance to 
job duties). 
 254. Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (rejecting a motion to dismiss 
a class action that challenged a police department’s use of written tests that had not been validated).  
 255. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 416 F.2d 123, 135–36 (8th Cir. 1969) 
(ordering local union to revise its journeymen’s entrance exam to ensure that it was designed to test 
job ability). 
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and Oklahoma256 reached similar results, as did the EEOC at the 
administrative level.257 Thus, when Griggs reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court, it was presented with an issue about which there had been robust 
debate in the courts, within the EEOC, and for many years prior to that, in 
state FEP agencies and the civil rights movement generally as well.  
IV.  THE LESSONS OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ANALYSIS  
The preceding analysis locating the origins of disparate impact analysis 
in experimentalist approaches aimed at remedying the structural causes of 
racial employment subordination leaves for further discussion the 
relevance of this history to debates about disparate impact analysis today. 
A supplementary and intertwined question is what this analysis offers to 
the ongoing development of social movement methodology in legal 
scholarship.  
As already noted, my claim is not that the history I uncover here 
compels the retention of disparate impact doctrine; instead, my point is a 
softer but no less important one—namely, that misconceptions about the 
historical pedigree of legal ideas, such as those espoused about the origins 
of disparate impact analysis in the work of Hugh Graham and others,258 can 
influence the perceived legitimacy of those ideas. Disparate impact 
analysis has been criticized as a last-minute, ill-conceived afterthought of 
the EEOC, improvidently adopted by the Court in Griggs,259 but a social 
movement analysis shows that the doctrine was the product of decades of 
lower-profile development among several generations of civil rights 
activists and sympathetic regulators. To be sure, the concepts underlying 
disparate impact analysis were not highly visible outside these circles of 
expert antidiscrimination advocates prior to the Court’s decision in Griggs, 
but this is part of the lesson of this narrative: The development and 
transmission of ideas about legal reform generated by social movements 
may not always be visible through traditional legal research techniques that 
focus on major case law developments. Attention to micro-level analysis of 
social movement activists’ incubation of reform ideas in lower-profile 
settings, such as at the state level and in work outside the realm of law, can 
                                                                                                                     
 256. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249–50 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding 
that an employer’s purportedly neutral policy of prohibiting transfers between two categories of 
driver jobs, which had discriminatory effects on minority employees, was not sufficiently justified 
by business necessity).  
 257. See ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 32 (1971) (citing a 1966 
EEOC administrative opinion involving a southern food processing company, which stated that, 
“[W]here, as here, the educational and testing criteria have the effect of discriminating and are not 
related to job performance, there is reasonable cause to believe that respondent, by utilizing such 
devices, thereby violates Title VII.”); id. at 33 n.51 (citing 1967 EEOC chair’s statement that, 
“[T]he true situation today is that discrimination is often not a specific incident, but . . . . the result 
of a system” and nondiscrimination “means the difficult process” of “challenging the system, of 
undoing its discriminatory effects . . . .”).  
 258. See generally sources cited, supra note 17. 
 259. See GRAHAM, supra note 17, at 383–89. 
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contribute to a fuller understanding of legal reform ideas. 
To recap my findings: Prototypical disparate impact ideas appear by the 
1940s and 1950s in the work of New York’s SCAD, as an extension of a 
voluntarist tradition pursued by the NUL as early as the 1910s. 
Experimentalist activists-turned-regulators such as Republican NUL editor 
Elmer Anderson Carter, along with New York State Governor Dewey and 
the moderate Republican legislators who actively supported Ives Quinn’s 
passage, held pro-business, anti-big government political views. They 
wished to end race discrimination in employment but not through heavy-
handed compulsion. Carter believed that appeals to employers to reassess 
their traditional employment practices to find ways to increase 
opportunities for racial outsiders was the most fitting method of 
accomplishing the dual goals of ending structural racial exclusion in 
employment while also avoiding an unduly restrictive regulatory regime.  
The experimentalist roots of disparate impact concepts thus contravene 
a common stereotype about disparate impact doctrine: Its origins do not lie 
in the demands of militant civil rights organizers, but instead in a pro-
business, regulatory-partnership model embraced by moderate  civil rights 
leaders. Activists like Carter envisioned using law to engineer social 
change, not primarily by resorting to the courts, but rather by encouraging 
employers to reflect on and take action suited to their situations. Carter 
wanted to soft-pedal change, approaching the Ives Quinn Act’s 
antidiscrimination mandate with expectations of employers’ good faith 
behavior, but also carrying the “stick” of potential lawsuits to command 
employers’ attention.  
In contrast, the push to enforce antidiscrimination mandates primarily 
through lawsuits in court came from lawyers and law-centric organizations 
such as the NAACP. These lawyer-activists and organizations distrusted 
flexible and voluntary approaches relying on employers’ good faith 
compliance efforts. This litigation-focused perspective necessarily makes 
disparate impact analysis a close cousin to disparate treatment, since 
litigation inherently involves accusing the defendant of doing something 
wrong or illegal. 
The tension between experimentalist and litigation-centric views of 
disparate impact concepts was a perennial one. It was present in the early 
years of SCAD’s enforcement of the Ives Quinn Act, when Carter, newly 
transferred to SCAD from his post as NUL editor, argued for the efficacy 
of voluntarist approaches, while the NAACP held news conferences and 
conducted litigation based on its conviction that SCAD was spending too 
little of its effort litigating in court. It was likewise present in the early 
enforcement days of Title VII, when the EEOC pursued carefully targeted, 
industry-wide campaigns to encourage employers to identify and 
voluntarily eliminate neutral practices that blocked minority employment 
advancement, while the NAACP sought to pressure the EEOC to process 
more complaints. The two organizations’ negotiation of a more cooperative 
relationship led to the pursuit of Griggs as a test case against a recalcitrant 
employer that resisted the EEOC’s campaign to induce voluntary reform in 
a targeted southern industry. 
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Not only was this tension perennial, but it was also productive despite 
the conflicts it sometimes engendered. The voluntarist approaches of the 
NUL avoided alienating the business community, while the more militant 
demands of the NAACP prodded employers to think more seriously about 
race reform. Staying out of court allowed early SCAD regulators to 
experiment with disparate impact concepts without the risk of having these 
ideas judicially annulled, while the threat of being hauled into court helped 
motivate employers to cooperate with SCAD’s suggestions to assess and 
overhaul traditional employment practices. After Title VII’s passage, the 
EEOC could follow SCAD’s example by adopting the “soft cop” approach 
of meeting with employers to encourage voluntary efforts to scrutinize and 
reform traditional employment practices, while it at the same time 
coordinated with the NAACP’s “tough cop” approach of aggressive and 
sophisticated litigation against recalcitrant employers such as the Duke 
Power Company, the defendant in Griggs.  
In short, a social movement history of disparate impact analysis shows 
that experimentalist and litigation-centric approaches to disparate impact 
concepts existed in competition and cooperation with each other. 
Experimentalism allowed for flexible, compliance-motivating approaches,  
while litigation offered the threat of accusatory, litigation-centric 
alternatives. Experimentalism in the 1940s and 1950s allowed SCAD to 
develop disparate impact precepts without the disciplining and potentially 
constraining supervision of the courts, while the litigation expertise of the 
NAACP and LDF later gave the EEOC the enforcement teeth knocked out 
during the legislative compromises leading to Title VII’s passage. 
At the same time, this narrative reveals the problems engendered when 
important ideas about law developed within social movements do not 
obtain high-visibility expression in popular culture. Part of the legitimacy 
crisis facing disparate impact analysis today surely stems from the fact that 
this doctrine is relatively technical and complex. Non-experts in the field 
often confuse it, sometimes naively and sometimes with more cynically 
calculated rhetorical motives, with bugbears such as quotas, strong race-
conscious mandates, and harsh forms of affirmative action. Supporters of 
disparate impact analysis are currently undertaking the task of articulating 
the policy benefits to all employees that flow from disparate impact 
standards. It may help this project to highlight as a primary policy 
justification for this doctrine its importance as an incentive-creating 
mechanism. Ideally, disparate impact doctrine encourages employers to use 
selection devices suited to measuring the performance characteristics 
required in particular jobs, without litigation.  
Just as activists have not sufficiently succeeded in convincing the 
public of the virtues of disparate impact analysis, even expert legal 
scholars have not sufficiently appreciated that the force of disparate impact 
law ultimately lies, not merely in litigation victories, but also in shaping 
employers’ incentives. This blind spot in employment scholars’ 
assessments stems from the litigation-centric perspective common in legal 
scholarship generally, which similarly manifests itself in social movement 
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legal scholarship, as others have pointed out.260  
Legal social movement scholars’ focus on courts has led to two other 
biases that deserve mention. One involves methodology, in legal scholars’ 
misguided tendency to look for the sources of law predominantly in the 
actions and ideologies of lawyers. In the case of disparate impact concepts, 
a focus on the attitudes of civil rights movement lawyers serves only to 
perpetuate a litigation-centric perspective on disparate impact doctrine: 
Because lawyers focus on litigation, legal scholars assume that disparate 
impact law was primarily intended as a route to litigation success. Opening 
the scope of inquiry to include the work of non-lawyers working in 
organizations focused on matters other than litigation, such as the NUL, 
reveals the existence of ideas about using law for purposes other than 
merely the creation of a cause of action enforceable through the courts. 
Second, as I have also shown, a litigation-centric view of the purposes 
and history of disparate impact law produces distorted, presentist notions 
of the importance of the concept of intent in the development of 
employment antidiscrimination principles. Today, intent plays a key role as 
the lynchpin of the disparate treatment paradigm,261 but that is because 
Washington v. Davis cleaved apart antidiscrimination tests based on intent 
versus effects. A presentist perspective ignores the fact that effects-based 
ideas were present at early stages of the development of employment 
discrimination law. From a very early period, civil rights activists were 
centrally concerned with the problem of pervasive, institution-based, 
structural employment subordination that had entrenched itself beyond 
particular employers’ prejudice, and it follows that their strategies would 
be addressed at combating this structural employment subordination built 
into institutional traditions, rather solely focusing on the invidious bad acts 
captured through a focus on intent. 
Finally, the social movement perspective offered here sheds new light 
on the interplay between Congress and the Court in the succession of cases 
from Griggs, through Wards Cove, to the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
amendments and, most recently, Ricci. Congress and the Court have been 
engaged in a dialogue about where to set the balance between protecting 
employers from undue liability exposure, on the one hand, and preserving 
the possibility of plaintiffs’ success in mounting disparate impact litigation 
challenges to employers’ selection practices, on the other. At this point, 
even without taking Ricci into account, this balance skews strongly against 
plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing, as shown both by the difficult burdens of 
proof at the prima facie stage of disparate impact analysis and by empirical 
                                                                                                                     
 260. See generally Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of 
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005) (criticizing legal social movement scholarship 
for tending to pivot around judges and their opinions); Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the 
Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001) (criticizing 
social movement legal scholarship for its tendency to focus on prescriptive arguments). 
 261. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134–35, 153 (2000) 
(“The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate 
treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.”).  
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evidence showing plaintiffs’ low chances of litigation success. At the same 
time, even after Ricci, lawyers for employers profess a continuing 
commitment to advising clients to conform to professionally accepted test 
validation practices.262 Thus, if the Court does not go so far in the future as 
to invalidate disparate impact analysis on constitutional grounds, Ricci may 
not pose as great a threat to the key policy objectives of disparate impact 
law as civil rights supporters fear.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
My analysis of the social movement history of disparate impact analysis 
offers new insights for participants on all sides of the post-Ricci debate 
about the future of disparate impact law. For those who bemoan the lack of 
plaintiff victories under this doctrine today, my analysis suggests that 
litigation victories were not the only goal of the activists who developed 
disparate impact doctrine. Instead, the criteria for judging the value of this 
doctrine should involve a more complex valuation embracing the 
expressive and incentive-producing aspects of this legal rule. Disparate 
impact doctrine may be doing important legal work even without 
substantial numbers of litigation victories because its purpose was and is to 
encourage employers to reflect on the possible benefits of choosing 
employment selection processes that better measure the elements of job 
performance needed for particular positions. To the critique that courts do 
not deal well with matters of structural discrimination,263 the perspective 
uncovered here responds that while this may well be true, the history of 
disparate impact law indicates that its underlying concepts were not 
intended solely for the use of courts. In this post-New Deal era,264 the 
regulatory style of our times may resonate with the experimentalist 
sensibilities of the moderate, pro-business civil rights activists of the NUL, 
who saw the threat of litigation and court enforcement as a useful 
persuasive backdrop to motivate employer compliance rather than as the 
enforcement mechanism of first resort. 
To supporters of disparate impact law, the analysis offered above may 
tentatively suggest the continuing beneficial effects of disparate impact law 
despite the Court’s attempts to shift this doctrine in a more pro-defendant 
direction—a goal that it seems bent on accomplishing, as shown by its 
succession of cases from Wards Cove through Ricci. The backdrop of 
disparate impact standards now codified by statute still presents a very real 
                                                                                                                     
 262. See Symposium on “Ricci v. DeStefano: The Future of Title VII Disparate Impact 
Litigation After the New Haven Fire Department Case,” Oct. 28, 2009, American University 
Washington College of Law, at 22:54–29:40 [hereinafter Ricci Symposium] (Comments of Grace 
Speights, Managing Partner at the leading employer-side law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 
LLP) (stating that nothing about Ricci changes the advice she will give her clients to comply with 
disparate impact test validation requirements) (recording on file with author).  
 263. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 15, at 2–3. 
 264. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 19, at 270–72 (connecting the increasing reliance on 
experimentalist regulatory techniques with the decline of the New Deal state and its associated 
bureaucracies).  
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threat of lawsuits from sophisticated plaintiffs’ lawyers in easy cases—
namely, those in which employers have failed even to attempt to design a 
test that conforms to professionally accepted validation norms for ensuring 
the fit between job performance and test design. The statutory articulation 
of disparate impact law is thus doing important legal work by providing 
leverage civil rights activists can use to advance civil rights goals in 
employment. It may be, in light of the new “substantial burden on innocent 
third parties” defense apparently created in Ricci, that plaintiffs’ counsel 
should seek to be more proactive in working with employers in the initial 
design of selection devices, before employers administer high-stakes tests. 
This is a suggestion to which some leading plaintiffs’ antidiscrimination 
counsel have expressed resistance,265 but may be a consequence of the 
Ricci decision that should not be overlooked.  
My reading of Ricci further suggests a new way of thinking about the 
dynamic of Court and Congressional dialogue on disparate impact 
standards. In Ricci, as in the Court’s earlier attempt to lower employers’ 
disparate impact liability risks under Wards Cove,266 the Court has 
appeared willing (at least for now) to leave the basic idea of disparate 
impact analysis intact, while lowering the liability threat to employers 
emanating from it. To some degree, the Court’s approach is consistent with 
early civil rights activists’ experimentalist views about the proper scope of 
employment antidiscrimination regulation—namely, that law should offer 
standards and guidance about good civil rights practices, along with fairly 
low probabilities of liability. This would lead employers to take some steps 
to lower liability concerns, such as test validation and use of professional 
test designers, but not to take unduly drastic measures, such as so-called 
“quota” hiring, to insulate themselves from a litigation threat set too high. 
It is possible to read the Ricci majority’s concerns in this way,267 even 
though the Court does not explicitly articulate such a framework. 
Supporters of disparate impact doctrine may correctly be troubled that 
Ricci disturbs the proper balance of liability incentives by increasing the 
chances of “reverse discrimination” disparate treatment claims while at the 
same time lowering the threat of disparate impact liability after a test’s 
administration; but at least Ricci does not appear to allow employers to 
disregard the need for proper design of selection processes ab initio. 
Finally, my analysis offers an important perspective should the Court 
follow Justice Scalia’s prediction that it must soon consider the 
                                                                                                                     
 265. See Ricci Symposium, supra note 262, at 1:15:46 (comments of Joseph M. Sellers, 
partner at a plaintiffs’ civil rights firm, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC) (“Plaintiffs are going 
to be, counsel at least, are going to be waiting to see how the tests are administered . . . . For one 
thing, there would be no violation of the law, as far as I read it, where there’s been no denial of 
some kind of employment opportunity.”).  
 266. See 490 U.S. 642, 654–57 (1989). 
 267. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(expressing concern that Title VII’s disparate impact provisions will require employers “to make 
decisions based on (because of) . . . racial outcomes”). My thanks to Sharon Rabin-Margaliot for 
her incisive presentation at the Fifth Annual Labor and Employment Law Colloquium and a 
subsequent informal conversation that clarified this reading of Ricci for me. 
300 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
constitutionality of the disparate impact doctrine. Justice Scalia 
characterizes disparate impact law as a race-conscious measure and, to 
some extent as already discussed, this is true, in the sense that it requires 
employers to take note of race-related statistics arising from their hiring 
and promotion practices. But this is a “soft” form of race consciousness, 
because it mandates no action on the basis of race per se, in the same way 
that the Court has previously upheld “soft” forms of race consciousness in 
voluntary affirmative action programs.268 What an experimentalist 
perspective on disparate impact law adds is the idea that assessment of the 
constitutionality of race-consciousness regulation should recognize the 
difference between “soft” versus “hard” regulatory approaches. Litigation-
centric approaches aimed at proving that employers engaged in illegal “bad 
acts” are a “hard” regulatory form, but more voluntarist approaches that 
call on employers to scrutinize their traditional practices and consider the 
adoption of alternatives that are both better suited to select employees 
based on job performance requirements and produce less severe disparate 
impact constitute a soft form of regulation, historically anchored in 
moderate, pro-business civil rights ideologies. Such approaches should 
pass constitutional muster as a legitimate means of balancing civil rights 
and pro-business policy considerations through means that preserve 
employer discretion. Otherwise the entire onus of civil rights law rests on 
the blame game of disparate treatment analysis.  
At the very least, it would be unfortunate to not recognize the 
voluntarist and experimentalist origins of disparate impact analysis when 
assessing its constitutional permissibility as part of long-standing goals of 
America’s flagship social movement for racial justice. 
                                                                                                                     
 268. See Primus, supra note 14, at 501, 585 (pointing to the Court’s recent opinions in 
affirmative action cases such as Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), upholding a flexible, 
carefully designed race-conscious law school affirmative-action admissions plan).  
